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ABSTRACT 
 
“Sustainable development” initiatives for addressing the effects of rapid urbanization have been 
divided between the paradoxically competing interests of climate change mitigation and pro-
poor economic development. Local employment is often excluded in favor of global 
environmental benefits. This thesis explores the environment–employment tradeoff in the 
“wicked problem” of the Jardim Gramacho landfill and Carbon Development Mechanism project 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Archival analysis is supplemented with fieldwork— including site 
analysis, interviews, and local workshops — to formulate a robust examination of stakeholder 
interests, influences and strategies. This is compared with other facets of the “wicked problem” 
to determine the flaws in the CDM and sustainable development framework, multi-scalar 
policies, institutional coordination, and local governance that preclude the Gramacho CDM 
project from being a vehicle for inclusive job creation.




This thesis could not have been completed without the support of my colleagues and friends in 
New York and Rio de Janeiro who have been extremely generous in sharing their time and 
expertise with me.  
 
I would like to thank Manuel Thedim, Fabrícia Ramos, Nina Fernández y Fernández, Pedro 
Rivera, and Raul Correa-Smith for their guidance on navigating the curiosities of Jardim 
Gramacho and Rio de Janeiro.  
 
I am very grateful for the continued encouragement and insights from my advisor Smita 





Yu  ||  ABBREVIATIONS GUIDE                                                                                 4 
ABBREVIATIONS GUIDE 
GENERAL CONCEPTS 
GHG Greenhouse gas 
MSW    Municipal solid waste 
MSWM Municipal solid waste management 
R$    Brazilian Real 
 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS / PROGRAMS 
Earth Summit / Eco-92 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
EPA* United States Environmental Protection Agency 
CERs Certified Carbon Reductions (issued by CDM Executive Board) 
CDM**    Carbon Development Mechanism 
IDB Inter-American Development Bank  
JIUS* US-Brazil Joint Initiative on Urban Sustainability (EPA program) 
UNFCCC**   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
UN-HABITAT* United Nations Human Settlements Programme 
Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (2012) 
 
FEDERAL (BRAZIL) ORGANIZATIONS / PROGRAMS 
Caixa Econômica  Brazilian Federal Savings Bank 
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank 
PNRS** National Policy on Solid Waste 
PNMC**   National Plan on Climate Change 
 
REGIONAL (RIO DE JANEIRO STATE) AGENCIES / PROGRAMS 
SEA*  Rio State Secretary of the Environment 
INEA**    Rio State Environmental Institute 
 
MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONS (RIO DE JANEIRO AND DUQUE DE CAXIAS) 
AMJG Municipal Landfill of Jardim Gramacho 
COMLURB* Rio Municipal Company of Urban Cleaning 
Caxias Prefeitura** Duque de Caxias municipal government 
Eduardo Paes**  Mayor of Municipality of Rio de Janeiro (2009-2016) 
IETS* Institute of Research on Employment and Society 
Reduc** Duque de Caxias oil refinery owned by Petrobras 
SMMA* Rio Municipal Secretary of the Environment 
SMC*  Rio Municipal Secretary of Conservation 
 
LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS (GRAMACHO NEIGHBORHOOD) 
Forum*  Community Forum of Jardim Gramacho 
ACAMJG* Association of Catadores of the Metropolitan Landfill of JG 
ACEX*   Association of Rio Catadores and Ex-catadores 
Coopercamjg*  Catadores & Recyclers Cooperative of the JG Metro Landfill 
Novo Gramacho* Private firm managing the Gramacho biogas remediation 
 
*Primary interview conducted during field research 
**Secondary interview data used and verified during field research
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of sustainable development does imply limits – not absolute limits but 
limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on 
environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human 
activities. But technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to 
make way for a new era of economic growth. The Commission believes that widespread 
poverty is no longer inevitable. Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but sustainable 
development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the 
opportunity to fulfill their aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is 
endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes (Brundtland, 1987: 19). 
 
How can planners and policymakers best achieve both global environmental protection and 
inclusive local development through urban sustainability projects? In preparation for the Rio+20 
United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, the municipalities of Rio de Janeiro 
and Duque de Caxias, Brazil ordered the closure of Jardim Gramacho, the largest landfill in 
Latin America. Gramacho served not only as the final disposal site for 75% of Rio’s municipal 
solid waste, it also provided livelihoods for approximately 2,000 catadores (waste pickers)1 and 
up to 3,000 additional workers in the region. A waste-to-energy Carbon Development 
Mechanism (CDM) project has been implemented with the support of the World Bank, United 
Nations, Inter-American Development Bank, US Environmental Protection Agency, and others 
to remediate the landfill. As a compensation in lieu of skills training and employment placement 
programs, 1,700 catadores were given a one-time payment of approximately R$14,0002. While 
the closure and rehabilitation of Jardim Gramacho has been hailed as a local and global 
environmental triumph, there has been little impact on local job creation or socioeconomic 
welfare for Gramacho residents. 
                                                
1 Various terms are used in reference to the global population who earn livelihoods from collecting, sorting, recycling 
and selling materials that someone else has thrown away. In 2008, participants and delegates at first World 
Conference of Waste Pickers reached a consensus to use the term “waste picker” in English, and in specific contexts, 
the term preferred by each local community. While there is still debate among policymakers, NGOS, recycling and 
waste picking cooperatives, and other specialists, the term waste picker is being used and adopted by leading 
research and policy organizations such as the United Nations, WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment), the World 
Bank, and others. In Brazil, the term “catador de material reciclável” — or reclaimer of recyclables — is specified in its 
National Classification of Occupations for this population. Thus, the Portuguese term “catador” or “catadores” will be 
used in this thesis to refer to the local Brazilian population of waste pickers and recyclers (Ijgosse, 2012).  
 
2 This amount is equivalent to approximately 10-37 months of income for a Gramacho catador household. The 2011 
median household income for Jardim Gramacho residents was R$370 per month— about half of the national 
minimum wage — regardless of employment type (IETS, 2011). However, previous surveys of catadores collected by 
COMLURB showed income ranges of R$100-R$1,300 per month with the highest incomes of R$100 per day 
recorded (Interviewee 1, 2013). 
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Whether couched under “sustainable development”, “urban sustainability”, “urban resilience”, or 
other terms, planning for the effects of rapid urbanization is often divided between the 
paradoxically competing interests of climate change mitigation and pro-poor economic 
development. Employment is disconnected from the discourse and policies of sustainability and 
sustainable development — themes that refer to environmental and ecological interests only. 
While Gramacho has tremendous significance for employment and environmental protection (up 
to 5,000 informal and low-skilled workers and over 60 million tons of waste), planning 
institutions at the international, national and regional-level seem only to be addressing the latter.  
 
By focusing on the intersection of local economic development, labor politics, and environmental 
sustainability, this thesis seeks to discover why internationally recognized “sustainable 
development” projects result in employment-environment tradeoffs. Analysis of the Jardim 
Gramacho landfill – namely the closure, negotiations, and development of the Novo Gramacho 
waste-to-energy CDM project – are used to access the conditions under which “sustainable 
development” projects can become inclusive, job creation vehicles for informal and marginalized 
urban residents. Particular attention is placed on how labor is discussed in the Jardim 
Gramacho remediation initiatives as well as within the CDM framework. Field research—
including site visits, stakeholder interviews, and workshops — and key policies and contracts at 
the municipal, national and international level are analyzed to determine the flaws in decision-
making that have resulted in the large social exclusion problem. These methods are used to 
produce concluding recommendations on reforming the CDM framework to better deliver on its 
promises of achieving both environmental and local socioeconomic objectives of sustainable 
development.  By analyzing the interests and influences of the diverse levels of stakeholders, 
this thesis examines the opportunities and challenges of creating a more inclusive Jardim 
Gramacho that benefits the local community of informal workers in addition to the Rio de Janeiro 




The employment and socioeconomic disparities that persist with the Jardim Gramacho Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) project suggest a tradeoff in favor of emissions reduction and 
biogas production over employment and skills training for the urban poor. I believe that this is a 
result of the following: 
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• The absence of local development and employment indicators within the CDM 
framework and sustainable development policies reduces the capacity of local 
municipalities to best negotiate and plan for local job creation as explicit outcomes of 
these projects. This results in a lack of functional coordination between the multiple inter-
scalar government agencies, private firms, NGOs, and multi-lateral organizations 
involved in project planning and implementation.  
 
• Convolution and conflicting interests from the many international actors in the project 
hinders local objectives and needs. Multi-lateral development institutions, foreign 
governments, and firms motivated by “sustainability” branding dominate many large-
scale sustainable development initiatives. The assumption is that this desire is prioritized 
above — and often at the cost of — environmental and economic development outputs 
that are actually achieved at the city and neighborhood level. Furthermore, the transition 
difficulties between international and local management, and lack of funding necessary 
to secure the long-term viability of these projects, often leads to their ultimate demise. 
  
I hypothesize that a more equitable plan that is inclusive of local livelihoods and economic 
development benefits can be achieved through:  
 
1. Privileging municipal-level actors and their capacity to set project objectives. 
This includes integrating local organizations and civil society groups in developing 
indicators and objectives for more contextualized plans that are inclusive of local 
communities and stakeholders. 
 
2. Planning for the displacement of local informal economies and communities by 
implementing job retraining, placement and other integration policies aimed at benefiting 
low-skilled, poor and marginalized populations who are left most vulnerable in the 
environment–employment tradeoff. 
 
IMPETUS FOR ACTION AND RESEARCH 
 
I arrived at this project through a happy combination of interests that were so well embodied by 
the Jardim Gramacho case that I could not ignore it. The urban livelihood question was what 
initially compelled me: I was stymied by the planning dilemma created by an environmental 
hazard that provides employment opportunities for generations of marginalized, urban poor 
whose lives and livelihoods are simultaneously damaged by and dependent upon the very same 
hazard. My interest in informal urban economies, livelihood protections for the urban poor, and 
the challenges they pose for city planning stem back to my previous international development 
work with the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), a labor union of poor women 
workers based in Gujarat, India. SEWA has successfully used its model of labor and community 
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organizing to empower self-employed, informal waste pickers through skills trainings and 
collective bargaining with the state and private firms. My experience with and admiration for 
SEWA’s work gave me also gave me a bias towards labor unions and waste picker associations 
as a solution for informal livelihood protection.  
 
Secondly, the curious conflation of international NGOs and foreign (i.e. non-Brazilian) agencies 
involved in the Novo Gramacho biogas and landfill remediation also sparked my interest. These 
international actors seemed all too willing to highlight their role in this “sustainable development” 
project, making me question their ability to effectively improve both environmental and 
employment conditions in the local context. I became most intrigued with how the livelihood 
component fit within the international sustainability agenda; and moreover, with what 
“sustainable development” has come to mean, after 20+ years of multi-lateral conferences, 
commitments and conventions that resulted in neither measurable poverty reduction nor climate 
change mitigation.   
 
Lastly, I could not ignore the compelling timeliness of these issues within the political, social and 
international context of Cidade Maravilhosa (the Marvelous City), by which Rio de Janeiro is 
known. Brazil’s enlightened federal legislation — with the Right to the City, rights and 
recognition of informal workers and catadores, and international climate change commitments 
— and regional hegemony as the world’s sixth largest economy3  makes it a particularly 
intriguing case study on the environment–employment tradeoffs for a rapidly urbanizing, 
emerging economy. The Rio context in particular, with its massive urban redevelopment in 
preparation for Rio+20, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics mega-
events, places this debate in a more critical, international light. What effect will the city’s 
exposure have on global environmental and local economic development goals? And how will 
Rio build and position its legacy amidst these varying interests and aims? 
 
In order to address my research question, the following must first be determined: 
1. Is there a tradeoff between environment and local employment? 
2. Who were the losers in this case? 
3. Who had the power to determine the final outcome? 
                                                
3 Brazil’s economy is ranked 6th by the United Nations and World Bank in 2011, and 7th by the International Monetary 
Fund in the 2012 World Economic Outlook Database based on GDP. 




It is important to make explicit my inherent biases and advantages as a researcher. As 
previously mentioned, my interests and previous work experience in international development – 
and “sustainable development” in particular – has made me partial to local solutions, community 
organizing and labor unions, and civil society-led participatory planning. Perhaps ironically, I am 
an international researcher with significant international NGO experience who is often 
dismissive of NGOs and the international community.  
 
I recognize my bias in even the selection of my research question and the lens through which I 
have chosen to analyze the Gramacho case: while Jardim Gramacho holds multiple challenges 
and implications for the field of city planning, this thesis is not a study of waste management, 
recycling, waste-to-energy, informal economies, regional governance or technology transfer. 
Those topics have clear significance for my research and can produce impressive dissertations 
in themselves, but they are not the central focus of this research. For this reason, literature 
review and discussion of the aforementioned challenges are limited to their direct relevance to 
the specific research question selected. The lens through which I have chosen to view this 
“wicked problem” 4  is that of employment–environment tradeoffs within the sustainable 
development and CDM framework. In defining my problem among the many that Gramacho 
presents — wicked in and of itself — I am assuming that there is a lack of equity in the catador 
compensation solution that transpired. 
 
However, my recognition of these biases has allowed me to formulate a research design and 
methodology with these complexities in mind. My research design encompasses collecting 
primary interview and secondary archival data from wide array of multi-scalar stakeholders, 
each with varying levels of interests, influence, and expertise related to my research question in 
addition the alternative challenges and issue lenses discussed above. This research design 
provides me with a more impartial and comprehensive perspective on the Gramacho case. 
Moreover, using the constant comparative method (CCM) in interviews and stakeholder group 
discussions (see Chapter III) allows me to test the biases embedded within my hypothesis and 
more clearly differentiate the biases of each stakeholder vis-à-vis my own. My data and analysis 
                                                
4 “Wicked problems” refer to Rittel and Webber’s planning paradox on being unable to provide objective, 
optimal solutions to complex problems social policy and social equity (Rittel and Webber, 1973).  
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is not subject to international sources only, for example, and conclusions gathered from 
international NGO documents and interviews are verified with state, municipal and local 
community sources. I hope to use my comprehensive analysis of the Gramacho stakeholders 
and their conflicts of interest to contribute to this debate. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Impact of Municipal Waste Management on Urban Sustainability 
 
Disposal, containment, and treatment of municipal solid waste (MSW) have become pressing 
challenges with far-reaching economic, environmental, and social impact in developing 
countries. Planning for municipal solid waste management (MSWM) requires the integration of a 
number of complex issues that are both within and outside the purview of environmental 
degradation. Factors include employment and job training for the formal waste management 
sector; livelihood and social protections for the informal waste and recycling sector; advocacy 
and public edification on waste production, collection, recycling and disposal methods; present 
and future costs to society; conservation of renewable resources; methods, logistics, and 
technologies for disposal, collection, and waste-to-energy generation; and reduction of waste 
disposal pollutants (Wilson, Velis and Cheeseman, 2006). The interwoven social, 
environmental, and economic facets and impacts of each further complicate the MSWM system, 
with solutions that often result in tradeoffs between social, environmental, and economic 
benefits.  
 
According to UN-Habitat, final disposal of MSW and improvement of MSWM is the most 
important issue in mitigating negative environmental impacts in developing countries (UN-
Habitat 2010). There are various types of final disposal technologies, including incineration, 
composting, biogas extraction and refinement, recycling and resource recovery, and others — 
all of which are environmentally better than landfills. Improvements in waste management —
namely the increase in waste recovery, reuse and recycling — are necessary in order to achieve 
sustainable development. The combination of technological and human mechanisms to achieve 
such improvements, however, is critical in determining the type of sustainable development that 
will be obtained.  
 
Environment vs. Development in Industrializing Nations 
 
The relationship between the environment and economic growth varies depending on the 
structure of the economy in question, the time span of the analysis, and the localized level of 
analysis (Karshenas, 1994). Early policies aimed at achieving sustainable development 
objectives were created based on indicators for environmental degradation only, and isolated 
other social and economic factors for environmental impact. The increase in greenhouse gas 
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(GHG) emissions, for example, was arguably correlated with the increase in economic growth 
and industrialization. Many policymakers and theorists believed this was evidence of a trade-off 
between environment and employment, mistakenly applying a false causal relationship between 
economic growth and environmental degradation to all global sustainable development cases. 
 
It is important to distinguish between advanced and developing economies when analyzing this 
relationship. Much of the confusion in the literature on the trade-offs between environment and 
development can be attributed to exporting policy prescriptions from developed countries to that 
of developing countries without much consideration of the local contexts. This has also been 
exacerbated by the absence of international standards and indicators for sustainable 
development, which favor more targeted environmental objectives such as GHG reduction and 
renewable energy production over wider social and environmental benefits (Sutter and Parreño, 
2007).  
 
In emerging economies, particularly dense urban regions with significant low-income 
populations such as Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, there is a clear, complementary relationship between 
employment generation and environmental preservation (Karshenas, 1994; Oliveira and Rosa, 
2006). This is a result of the direct correlation between poverty and environmental degradation. 
“Habitation and the environment” and “habitat and economic development” are two mutually 
reinforcing ways of improving the lives of the urban poor. Not only are the urban poor most 
directly affected by environmental degradation, their environmental, employment and physical 
living conditions are intertwined. And thus, increasing the livelihoods and incomes of urban 
residents can also help improve the urban environment (Teerlink and Frank, 1993). This 
integrated framework is essential in examining and re-conceptualizing sustainable development 
objectives, incentives and policies.  
 
The Informal Waste Sector: Waste Picking and Recycling as Livelihood 
 
Cities in developing countries often collect only 50–80% of MSW generated, while the rest is 
often disposed at open dumping sites (Medina and Dows, 2000). However, this environmental 
hazard is partially moderated by the high rate of recycling conducted by waste pickers, many of 
whom rely on informal sorting and recycling at landfills and dump sites for their livelihood. Waste 
picking provides a source of employment and livelihood to extremely poor populations with 
limited education and skills. It serves as a crucial a safety net to women, children, migrants, the 
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elderly, the disabled, the unemployed, and other vulnerable groups, especially in the current 
economic recession (Medina, 2007).  
 
While there are varying definitions of what the “informal sector”5 constitutes, the concept of the 
“informal sector” used in this study follows that of Chen, Dias, WIEGO, and contemporary ILO 
researchers in expanding upon the dualist, structuralist and legalist schools of thought6. This 
expanded definition “focuses on the nature of employment, in addition to the characteristics of 
enterprises” and thereby examines employment relationships that are not regulated or protected 
instead of only those that are not legally regulated (Chen, 2012; Ijgosse, 2012). The intersection 
of formal and informal working relationships in this manner also reflects the connections 
between the two, especially in the case of MSW. The significance of the informal waste 
management sector for formal — and the impact of formal-informal integration on increased 
livelihoods, improved work / living conditions, and empowerment of marginalized populations — 
have been widely espoused in recent research (Wilson et al, 2006; Dows & Medina, 2000; Dias 
and Alves, 2008; etc.).  
 
In Latin America, waste pickers who subsist on informal recycling account for approximately 2% 
of the urban population, with over 500,000 catadores in Brazil representing approximately 1.3% 
of the informal urban workers (Medina, 2000). While over 56% of Brazilian catadores earn below 
minimum wage and live in poverty (Ibid), this industry has been cited by multiple scholars as 
crucial for the social, economic and environmental viability of sustainable recycling and MSWM 
(Scheinberg, 2012; UN-Habitat 2010; Wilson, Velis and Cheeseman 2006). Its contributions to 
urban development also extend to broader economic benefits. Waste picking supplies raw 
materials to industries and creates various associated jobs in the recycling supply chain for 
middlemen who sort, purchase, process, and resell recyclables collected by waste pickers 
(Medina, 2007). In addition, informal recycling reduces the quantity of virgin materials required 
for production, thereby also reducing water and energy consumption, waste production, landfill 
                                                
5 The use of the term “informal sector” was established and popularized in the 1970s by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), who developed the main dualist school theories on the subject. 
 
6 The dualist school argues that the “informal sector of the economy is comprised of marginal activities – distinct and 
not related to the formal sector – that provide income for the poor and a safety net in times of crisis” (Chen, 2012). 
The structuralist school sees the informal sector “as subordinated economic units / enterprises and workers that serve 
to reduce input and labour costs, and thereby increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms” (Ibid). Lastly the 
legalist school “subscribes to the notion that the informal sector is comprised of ‘plucky’ micro-entrepreneurs who 
chose to operate informally in order to avoid costs, time and effort of formal registration, and who need enforceable 
property rights to convert their assets into legally recognized assets” (Ibid).   
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size, and pollution. This process makes significant contributions to climate change mitigation, in 
addition to meeting many of the goals outlined by UN-Habitat, the World Bank, and other 
international organizations on waste management and sustainable development (Scheinberg, 
2012).  
 
Genesis of Sustainable Development  
 
The employment–environment dichotomy can be traced back to the clash between 
environmentalists and development specialists in formulating sustainable development agendas 
for the 1972 United Nations Conference on Human Environment, also known as the Stockholm 
Conference (Satterthwaite, 1997). Various debates have centered on green and brown divide: 
contention between investment in centers of urban poverty and slums versus that of 
environmental and ecological protection. Many argue that cities contribute severely to global 
environmental degradation, and that funding should be divested from urban slums and 
discourage polluting urban activities. Others have criticized the former perspective as unjustly 
biased against pro-poor economic development, arguing that environmental justice inequalities 
have disproportionately affected the urban poor, and investment in slums and urban 
impoverished areas could have the biggest impact on reducing pollution. 
 
Policymakers at the national, regional and municipal levels have acknowledged the significance 
of global environmental degradation by supporting broad “sustainable urban development” 
initiatives (United Nations Conferences on Human Settlements, Agenda 21, World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, Kyoto Protocol, others). However, there is a lack of agreement on the 
indicators and priorities of the sustainability agenda, leading government and international 
agencies to pick and choose among diverse environmental, economic, social, political, cultural 
and institutional objectives in defining their own sustainable development goals  
 
The most widely used definition of sustainable definition is from the 1987 Brundtland Report:  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs… in particular the 
essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given… A 
process of change in which exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
reorientation of technology development; and institutional change are all in harmony and 
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations. 
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(Brundtland, 1987: 43-6)  
 
While many definitions had been put forward prior to the report, this was the most influential in 
the popularization of sustainable development for two key reasons. First, its explicit call for an 
economically and ecologically integrated framework separates it from earlier notions of ecology-
only and econometrics-heavy approaches (Karshenas, 1994). Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, it claims that long-term realization of human needs and aspirations are central to 
sustainable development. 
 
The Brundtland Commission report was the impetus for the 1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, known as the Earth Summit. As the first 
international summit for government leaders to explicitly address global environmental 
problems, it formally united the two fields of environmental ecology and economic development. 
This resulted in Agenda 21, a set of goals and recommendations by which UN member states 
agreed upon to achieve the “three pillars of sustainability”: environmental, economic, and social. 
 
The great breadth contained in the definition of sustainability within these international 
agreements has thus made it difficult for many policymakers, researchers, and institutions to 
apply specific indicators and select the best implementation strategies. The diverse range of 
goals attributed to sustainable development has allowed international NGOs and governments 
to characterize at least parts of all their initiative as aimed at “sustainable development” 
(Satterthwaite, 1997). This debate is epitomized in the current Jardim Gramacho CDM and new 
waste-to-energy infrastructure in Rio de Janeiro. Despite the growing recognition of the 
economic, social and environmental benefits of formal and informal recycling, “sustainable” 
waste-to-energy CDM projects have been heavily criticized for focusing only on producing 
renewable energy and reducing GHG emissions at the cost of livelihoods for the urban poor 
(Sutter and Parreño, 2007).  
 
Twin Objectives of Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM)  
 
In 2007, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) established Carbon Development Mechanism (CDM), inaugurating carbon credit 
trading as a means of reducing global GHG emissions. As defined in Article 12 of the protocol, 
CDM projects are intended to lower the overall costs of achieving emissions targets for UN 
member states that have signed onto the Kyoto Protocol. It does this through assisting countries 
Yu  ||  II. LITERATURE REVIEW                                                                               17 
without emissions targets (i.e. developing countries) to achieve sustainable development and 
helping countries with emission reduction targets (i.e. developed countries) comply with their 
Kyoto commitments by allowing them to purchase Certified Emissions Reductions (CER), or 
“carbon credits” issued by the CDM Executive Board for approved projects (UNFCCC 2012). 
These CERs are often produced by developing countries and purchased and offset by 
developed countries (Sutter and Parreño, 2000). While the cost of limiting emissions varies 
considerably from region to region, the benefit for the global environment is in principle the 
same regardless of where the carbon reduction is being implemented. 
 
Thus, CDM was designed to fulfill the Kyoto Protocol’s twin objectives: to contribute to local 
sustainable development in the host country and assist Annex-I [developed] countries to 
achieve their emission reduction targets in a cost-efficient manner. Despite the twofold goals, 
previous studies examining the impact of CDM projects report a trade-off that favored emissions 
reduction while neglecting local employment generation and socioeconomic development. The 
absence of international sustainable development standards alongside a very competitive 
supply side of CDM was concluded to be the likely cause of the pro-environment tradeoff (Sutter 
and Parreño, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, the CDM’s design as a market-driven mechanism is in itself biased against local 
development, as only one of its two objectives can be reflected by its market price. While 
Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) have a distinct market-based sales price per ton of CO2 
reduced, they do not reflect project contributions to local sustainable development (Sutter and 
Parreño, 2007). Thus under this design, CDM projects will be inherently biased against local 
socioeconomic development and the employment objectives of sustainability, unless these 
elements can be measured and incorporated into the market price signals. 
 
Rio+20 and Beyond 
 
A recent shift towards an explicitly urban view of sustainability was developed from the Rio+20 
UN Conference held in June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. United Nations member states have 
recognized the significance of institutional factors related to governance and the changing role 
of local government in addressing “sustainability” goals—both environmental, employment and 
economic development at the local and global level. Additionally, Rio+20 commitments included 
the critical goals of inclusive job creation and urban employment, and the integration of such 
targets into national urban policies for member states.  
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This has led to the inclusion of “Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements” in the Post-2015 
UN Development Agenda, with the overall goal “to promote cities that are environmentally 
sustainable, socially inclusive, economically productive and resilient” (UN-HABITAT, 2012). As 
mentioned earlier, this includes the explicit National Urban Policy target, of having “50% of the 
countries adopt and implement inclusive national urban policies to coordinate ministerial and 
sectorial efforts and different levels of government for sustainable urban development” (Ibid). 
 
In addition, “Urban Job Creation” has been included for the first time as an overt target of this 
agenda. Current proposals advocate for more than half of global cities and to adopt and 
implement “by 2030… specific and inclusive polices to improve the lives of urban dwellers 
through urban job creation focused particularly on youth and women” (Ibid).  
 
And yet the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood is fraught with extreme socioeconomic problems 
and Gramacho catadores are without livelihoods, despite the seemingly progressive agenda 
discussed by international actors at the very same Rio event for which their livelihoods were 
eliminated. While the Rio Eco-92 and latest Rio+20 UN conferences led to significant resolutions 
and commitments by the host country and city on “sustainable development,” the Jardim 
Gramacho case remains a visible paradox of these ideals.   
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
In examining the tradeoffs and conflicts between global environmental sustainability and local 
economic development, this thesis analyzes both social and environmental impacts of Jardim 
Gramacho landfill and its biogas CDM project. A mixed-method approach was used to 
supplement archival analysis with field research, including semi-structured interviews, and site 
analysis. Document review of multi-scalar government contracts, policies, and reports were 
conducted and verified through and interviews with government agencies, NGOs and civil 
society organizations at the international, national, and municipal levels. Additionally, I 
organized a public workshop at the end of my field research with key stakeholders from the 
neighborhood, municipality, state and international NGO groups in open discussions about their 
varying roles and interests as it pertains to the closure and remediation of Jardim Gramacho. 
Data collected from 22 interviews conducted in Rio de Janeiro and Duque de Caxias, Brazil 




For the purpose of this project, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction and renewable 
energy production are used as indicators for global environmental sustainability; and local job 
creation and skills training for low-skilled workers (marginalized, informal economies, and urban 
poor) as indicators for local economic development. By using the case of Jardim Gramacho and 
new Novo Gramacho waste-to-energy Carbon Development Mechanism (CDM) project in Rio 
de Janeiro, this thesis seeks to determine where and how local employment fits within the 
priorities of “urban sustainable development”. 
 
The CDM program is used as a narrowing lens by which to analyze internationally recognized 
“urban sustainability” projects due to the availability of public data from the World Bank, the 
UNFCCC, and other organizations; and the involvement — and thus multiple and conflicting 
interests — of multi-level international, national and municipal organizations in project 
development and implementation. Additionally, CDM’s official and widely acknowledged status 
as contributing to climate change mitigation and sustainable development invites further study of 
this claim. 
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The majority of existing MSWM and informal waste picking studies are heavily skewed towards 
either ethnographic approaches and surveys of waste pickers, or quantitative economic and 
environmental analysis. Both research methods commonly focus only on one type of state or 
institutional actor (e.g. posing waste pickers against the municipal government only). In contrast, 
this study uses a more comprehensive analysis of the wide array of actors that are directly 
impacted by and influence the project outcomes.  
 
This thesis seeks to contribute an alternative method to re-examine waste picker inclusion and 
biogas landfill remediation issues within the employment-environment “sustainable 
development” framework. The stakeholder analysis and site history provides a more 
comprehensive examination of the interests, influences and strategies enacted by the multitude 
of actors that impact and are impacted by the Gramacho project. This is discussed in Chapters 
V and VI as the chronological amalgamation of stakeholder experiences and perspectives on 
the physical, environmental, and social conditions of the landfill site and catador livelihoods. 
Additionally, this analysis will also provide a critical means by which to extract the objectives of 
each actor, their priorities and significance in hindering and/or integrating local labor with 
environmental sustainability summarized in Chapter VI. 
 




Primary data was collected through semi-structured, open ended interviews with 22 key 
stakeholders, including members of the formal and informal waste and recycling industries, 
municipal government agencies, policy makers, waste picking unions, and residents in the Rio 
metro area. While interviews followed key lines of questioning, with a structure reflecting the 
chronology of events related to the Jardim Gramacho interventions, interviewees were 
encouraged to elaborate and discuss themes more relevant to their interview experiences (see 
Appendix 3). Interview data collection used a constant comparative method, whereby data 
collected from individual and group interviews were continuously compared with previously 
collected interview data. Results from each interview, for example, were analyzed and then 
compared to that of earlier interviews throughout the field research interview process. Thus from 
the first interview onwards, interview data led to new questions and new participants / 
interviewees in order to clarify conflicting information, better understand local issues and 
contexts, and confirm or reject anecdotal data (Bjerkli, 2013; Boeije, 2002).  
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Interview data is an essential component of this project in determining the needs and 
opportunities for informal waste pickers to maintain and increase their livelihoods. These 
methodologies are significant in determining the complex and conflicting levels of influence and 
interests of international, multilateral institutions as they relate to the environment-employment 
debate within sustainable development planning. Responses from 22 stakeholder interviews 
were conducted in a semi-formal workshop and working sessions (see Appendix 1) were 
analyzed to test the hypothesis. Targeted interview subjects include but are not limited to 
members of municipal government agencies (e.g. COMLURB Waste Management and Urban 
Cleaning Company, Secretary of the Environment, Office of the Mayor); international institutions 
(e.g. US EPA, United Nations, C40); energy and biogas firms (Novo Gramacho); and community 
and civil society groups (e.g. ACAMJG, Community Forum of Jardim Gramacho, IETS). 
Interview subjects were evenly distributed among the key stakeholder groups as to avoid bias in 
data collection among different actors.  
 
Individuals were recruited on a voluntary basis only, via email or phone call from contacts 
suggested by advisors to this research study, including academic and professional colleagues in 
New York, Washington DC, and Rio de Janeiro. All interview subjects were selected for their 
expertise on and direct involvement in the Jardim Gramacho waste-to-energy project and/or 
other relevant CDM and sustainable development initiatives in the Rio metro area. Interview 
data remained anonymous, and each subject was notified of the objectives of the research and 
academic use of the research outputs prior to his or her participation. Interviews were subject to 
the approval of department or agency directors, and ranged from 15 minutes to more than two 
hours over the course of a site visit. Most subjects were interviewed more than once, in both 
one-on-one semi-structured conversations in addition to a stakeholder group workshop.  
 
Jardim Gramacho Workshop at Studio-X Rio 
 
Additionally, I organized a workshop on Jardim Gramacho in Rio de Janeiro upon the 
completion of field research at Studio-X Rio, a local exhibition and research facility affiliated with 
Columbia GSAPP (see Appendix 1). Multi-scalar stakeholders — from catadores and Gramacho 
residents, Rio Prefeitura and Caxias Prefeitura agencies, Rio state government agencies, to 
representatives of international NGOs — were invited to openly discuss their perspectives on 
the Gramacho landfill and its aftermath, current conditions with respect to environmental and 
local economic development, as well as challenges and opportunities for Gramacho community 
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revitalization. The event served as a forum to spark dialogue between the various stakeholders, 
and encouraged them to discuss critical issues with the various interests and biases of others in 
mind in a politically uncharged, academic environment.  
 
The workshop was open to the public, allowing local students, policymakers, and residents 
interested in the issue to attend. A total of 37 participants, including speakers, were in 
attendance. While each of these stakeholders were interviewed one-on-one prior to the 
workshop, their group discussions and open disagreements — along with questions and 
participation from others — further enriched the research and stakeholder analysis. The 
workshop not only served as a critical element in my data collection and field research, many of 
the participants also expressed positive remarks on being given an opportunity to more 
comprehensively debate and understand the issue from the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders involved. For the Gramacho residents and government agencies in particular, the 
open, face-to-face discussion was a rare opportunity to exchange and connect on each group’s 
interests and ideas for revitalization. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
 
From analysis of legal documents and inter-municipal contracts, site visits, and stakeholder 
interviews conducted during two weeks of field research in March 2013, I discovered that my 
hypothesis was almost entirely wrong. The local context and problems pertaining to Jardim 
Gramacho were significantly different than those found through desk research and international 
archival analysis. The uniqueness of this case, including the historical, physical and social 
conditions of the site as well as the evolving municipal and local politics, is critical in 
understanding this body of research. These local conditions, as described in the subsequent 
chapters, make applying successful waste picker integration cases from elsewhere in Brazil, 
Latin American or around the world to the Gramacho case unconstructive due to the unique 
combination of challenges currently present in Jardim Gramacho.  
 
SUMMARY + SURPRISES  
 
1. International actors had little to no influence on the social and employment 
outcomes of the Jardim Gramacho landfill closure, biogas CDM proposal and 
subsequent negotiations with Gramacho catadores and neighborhood residents on 
compensation and revitalization plans. 
2. There is a significant lack of solidarity at the neighborhood level, including 
competition and in-fighting among catadores cooperatives. Jardim Gramacho has 
lacked an established sense of “community” or collective organization of its diverse 
populations. While municipal and civil society groups made efforts to incorporate the 
local “community” in the final plan for the landfill closure, conflicting interests between 
the various catadores groups and non-catador residents hindered their ability to 
negotiate for collective needs. Henceforth, the term “neighborhood” will be used to 
describe the residential and commercial area adjacent to landfill known as Jardim 
Gramacho, composed of ex-catadores, catadores associations and cooperatives, non-
organized catadores and non-catador residents. These neighborhood groups will be 
referred to by their specific populations in subsequent chapters to differentiate their 
respective interests and influences in contributing to forming a “Jardim Gramacho 
community”. Presently, the Community Forum of Jardim Gramacho is the only local 
organization recognized by the multiple neighborhood populations that represents the 
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nascent community. There is an urgent need for community support, capacity building, 
and neighborhood-level interventions to ameliorate these challenges, as discussed in 
Chapter VII. 
3. The Rio and Caxias municipalities’ original proposal was to allocate a portion of 
biogas and CER profits for a Fund for Catadores, to be managed by the Caxias 
Prefeitura with employment placement, skills training, and other uses determined by a 
joint committee of local stakeholders. Both catadores and non-catador residents of the 
Jardim Gramacho neighborhood refuted this proposal. 
4. The most influential actors were the Rio Prefeitura (namely Mayor Eduardo Paes) 
and the catadores associations. After negotiations between the municipalities and 
catadores stalled due to conflicting interests at the neighborhood-level — and due in part 
to the impending Rio+20 conference and the Rio mayoral elections — Paes opted for 
swift action in offering catadores a “democratic” vote for a final decision on the 
employment and socioeconomic compensation question. Catadores selected the 
R$14,000 single payment compensation as their solution, in lieu of a fund for collective 
skills training, job placement and other employment programs.  
5. While there is contention regarding the equity and desirability of the one-vote process 
and its resulting single payment solution, it must be noted the municipal and state 
governments privileged catadores groups above unorganized catadores and non-
catador residents. The presence, activities and closure of the landfill had significant 
negative impacts on the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood, for both catadores and non-
catador resident populations. Neither the fund nor single-payment options were designed 
to address the root causes of the many socioeconomic problems and lack of basic 
services that dramatically impact both catadores and non-catador residents.  
 
The current socioeconomic and employment conditions in the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood 
are severely deprived, and many residents, catadores and ex-catadores live in extreme poverty 
without livelihoods or access to basic social services. The following chapters describe these 
conditions, the impact of the CDM framework and Gramacho’s “sustainable” remediation, and 
influences and processes under which the compensation “solution” was developed. 
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V. THE LARGEST LANDFILL IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
The Metropolitan Landfill of Jardim Gramacho (AMJG7) was established in 1978 by the 
Foundation for the Development of the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro (FUNDREM), a 
regional planning authority controlled by Brazil’s military government in the 1970s, as the final 
waste disposal site for the municipalities within Rio metropolitan region. FUNDREM selected a 
federally-owned mangrove swamp of nearly 500 acres in the municipality of Duque de Caxias, 
bordering the Guanabara Bay and the Iguaçu and Sarapuí rivers, as the landfill site. The main 
criteria for site selection were its equidistance between the municipalities and the availability of 
public land usable for such allocation (IETS, 2011). In agreement with the regional municipalities 
of Duque de Caxias, Nova Iguaçu, Nilópolis, Sâo Joâo de Meriti, and Rio de Janeiro — the 
Brazilian capital at the time — FUNDREM assigned the operation and management of AMJG to 
the Municipal Urban Cleaning Company of Rio de Janeiro (COMLURB).  
 
 
Figure 1. Map of AMJG and surrounding nodes (Google Earth, 2012 with labels from author). 
                                                
7 The Municipal Landfill of Jardim Gramacho will be henceforth referred to as AMJG, as distinct from the Jardim 
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Initially designed to receive approximately 3,000 metric tons of garbage a day for a total lifespan 
of about 20 years, AMJG was planned with a commitment of joint funding from the municipalities 
for maintenance and environmental mitigation (Ibid). Despite violations of several national 
environmental ordinances due to its proximity to major waterways, the lack of political will and 
monetary investment from the municipalities in the metro region prevented a relocation of the 
site and proper landfill construction methods. AMJG remained an open waste dump for the next 
17 years, with legal and illegal waste dumped 365 days a year, lack of treatment and 
containment, and unmeasured amounts of sewage and leachate leaking straight into the 
Guanabara Bay.   
 
The selected history and analysis below depict the social and environmental conditions of 
Jardim Gramacho, including interventions and plans proposed by international, national and 
local actors to address both its environmental and socioeconomic livelihood challenges. 
 
FROM DUMP TO LANDFILL: HISTORY + SITE ANALYSIS 
 
Lixão: 1978 – 1995 (Open Waste Dump) 
 
Figure 2. Diagram of Brazilian classification of a lixâo, or open waste dump (Pólita Gonçalves and author). 
The opening of the landfill had an immediate impact on the residential neighborhood of Jardim 
Gramacho. Informal settlements were constructed to hold recyclables sorted from the open 
dump, and self-constructed and precarious housing was built to accommodate a growing 
Yu  ||  IV. THE LARGEST LANDFILL IN LATIN AMERICA                                                         27 
population of catadores, many of whom had migrated from other landfills or waste dumps in the 
area for new livelihood opportunities. Between 1978 and 1988, daily waste dumped at AMJG 
gradually increased from 3,000 to 5,000 tons, again without sorting, compacting, treatment, 
coverage, or lining of the landfill (IETS, 2011). Additionally, no measures were taken for 
methane gas capture, rainwater collection, sewage, or leachate drainage except into the rivers 
and the bay. Environmental conditions were so disastrous, fires broke out in the site and 
adjoining estuary due to the buildup of landfill methane gas and extreme pollution. Smoke from 
fires in the estuary and within the dump itself, coupled with large groups of vultures flying 
overhead, reportedly affected flights in and out of the international airport located 9 miles south 
of the site (Interviewee 2, 2013; Interviewee 5, 2013; IETS, 2011).  
 
While the population of catadores gradually increased, there were no security or monitoring 
processes for waste picking nor labor policies and social protections were in place. The dump 
was open at all hours of the day everyone to anyone who wished to enter. Women, children, the 
elderly, drug traffickers, criminals, prostitutes, drug addicts, the homeless, anyone “in a 
desperate situation could and did come to Gramacho… it was a lawless land” (Interviewee 5, 
2013). Some catadores worked a few days a week and commuted to the dump while others 
resided at the site, in the waste and among other catadores; still others came to the dump for its 
secluded, removed and unrestricted location, rather than initially coming for waste picking or 
other livelihood opportunities. Most catadores worked alone and were self-employed, and 
despite a few informal groups that formed to support one another, no effective organization or 
cooperative of catadores were formed during this period. Many also came to the site for other 
informal exchanges and illegal activities to support the growing catador population, including 
sales and preparation of edible food waste, drug trafficking, and prostitution, among others. 
Catadores typically worked three shifts, with the night shift reserved for more illicit and criminal 
activities. Without policing or security from COMLURB or the city, drug traffickers and gangs 
became the de facto regulators of the site and its activities (Interviewee 2, 2013). 
 
Over time, garbage beyond MSW was dumped onto the site, including industrial and hospital 
waste, creating a tremendous public health and environmental hazard. Many of the catadores 
and nearby residents became sick with bacterial and viral infections, and passed away in the 
dump (Interviewee 5, 2013). By 1995 4,500  4,800 tons of waste per day were dumped at 
Jardim Gramacho, approximately 88% of which was from the municipality of Rio de Janeiro 
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alone. Uncompact, untreated waste dumped onto the site grew to more than 105 feet high, 
greatly surpassing the 3,000 tons per day for which the landfill was originally designed 
(COMLURB, 2005). Meanwhile, COMLURB continued to manage the dump without payment 
and maintenance from the other municipalities. Moreover, there was reportedly no dialogue or 
cooperation between the municipalities of the Rio metro region who used Jardim Gramacho for 
its daily waste disposal, preventing any one actor from taking responsibility for and addressing 
the social and environmental issues Gramacho produced (IETS, 2011).  
 
Aterro Controlado: 1996 – 2004 (Controlled Landfill) 
 
Figure 3. Diagram of a Brazilian aterro controlado or controlled landfill (Pólita Gonçalves and author). 
 
As Jardim Gramacho’s social and environmental crisis heightened, the 1990s also gave way to 
a new wave of environmental advocacy and concern about the fate of MSW and MSWM at the 
national and international levels. The need for immediate action and remediation was catalyzed 
by the Earth Summit, also known as the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development or Eco-92, held in June 3-14, 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. In forming Agenda 21, the 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and other significant sustainable development and climate change 
conventions, the Earth Summit brought the international spotlight to Rio’s social and 
environmental disaster.  
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It is noteworthy, however, to mention that the international pressure on COMLURB and local 
municipalities were aimed primarily at environmental remediation, including cleanup of the 
Guanabara Bay and remediation of mangrove swamps and neighboring soils. Advocacy groups 
even called for the closure of the site, a proposal which was, according to some, temporarily 
supported by COMLURB but ultimately rejected due to staunch disapproval from the other 
municipalities and the lack of political will (Interviewee 1, 2013). Review of government 
contracts, periodicals, and reports released by the groups involved showed no evidence of 
international attention on Gramacho’s socioeconomic and livelihood implications. In mid-1992, 
an assessment of Jardim Gramacho landfill recovery was included in an Inter-American 
Development (IDB) program for an environmental remediation of Guanabara Bay. The IDB 
studies indicated a need for investments projected at R$12 million, but the program failed to 
implement recycling and composting plants and international funding streams were eventually 
cut. Due to the lack of funding, land and political will, COMLURB used the IDB technical reports 
to open a public bid in 1995 for landfill recovery and remediation rather than propose a new 
landfill site and overhauling the Rio MSWM system (IETS, 2011). 
 
In 1996, COMLURB, through the Rio de Janeiro municipal treasury, invested approximately 
R$150 million into the initial landfill recovery intervention, including extensive physical 
improvements that transformed the site from a lixâo (open dump site) to the aterro controlado 
(controlled landfill) that is officially recognized as the Aterro Metropolitano de Jardim Gramacho 
(IETS, 2011). This also marked the first of many public bids and concessions managed by 
COMLURB, in which COMLURB supervised and contracted the following private companies to 
implement and operate AMJG:  
• Queiroz Galvão SA (1996-2001) 
• SA Paulista (2001-2006) 
• The CAENGE Environmental (2006-2008) and  
• Novo Gramacho Energia Ambiental SA (2008 – present) 
 
Environmental remediation and protections implemented during this period, as well as in its full 
transition from controlled landfill to sanitary landfill include (COMLURB, 2012): 
• Paving vehicular access roads around the periphery and through the site 
• Monitoring and evaluation of Guanabara Bay and Sarapuí and Iguaçu Rivers 
• Compacting and covering solid waste with natural soils, clay and vegetation 
Yu  ||  IV. THE LARGEST LANDFILL IN LATIN AMERICA                                                         30 
• Refitting the landfill with impermeable clay lining 
• Capturing and flaring of landfill gas (methane-based biogas)  
• Containing and improving the rainwater drainage system  
• Collecting and treating leachate and waste slurry  
• Replanting of natural plant species surrounding the site 
• Regenerating 110 hectares of mangroves in the neighboring swamp.  
 
COMLURB and its contractors also started a few significant social interventions in monitoring 
and supporting the large population of catadores. Beginning in 1996, Queiroz Galvão SA built a 
triage center at the entrance of the landfill, with a social worker who provided support and 
monitoring of the large, on-site catador population. The social worker helped to register and 
organize catadores, and greatly contributed to the formation of COOPERGRAMACHO, the first 
recognized cooperative of catadores at AMJG (IETS, 2011). While there were a few small 
groups of 5-10 catadores informally who banded together to protect one another in the “lawless 
land of Gramacho,” there were virtually no reports of politically or financially organized 
catadores. This was attributed to the powerful presence of the drug traffickers and gangs who 
controlled AMJG and the surrounding neighborhoods in the absence of police and other city 
management, as the drug lords were a significant factor in intimidating individuals from joining 
and forming cooperatives or enterprises (Ibid; Interviewee 5, 2013). 
 
Studies and reports from catadores familiar with the social dynamics at the time recalled the 
difficulty of recruiting members for COOPERGRAMACHO due to the perceived loss of 
independence and self-reliance the cooperative represented. While the cooperative reportedly 
did not impose workday or shift limits and required very little remuneration other than a small fee 
upon sale of recyclables collected, joining the cooperative meant that one had “to submit to 
rules and lose autonomy as you work” (IETS, 2011). The great “self-reliant, autonomous spirit of 
catadores and severe mistrust of other… be they government, private firms, NGOS, other 
catadores” hindered the success of such an organization (Interviewee 5, 2013). Thus 
COOPERGRAMACHO attracted less than 100 catadores at its height, most of them women and 
the elderly who placed greater value on social security and life insurance guaranteed by the 
cooperative. 
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Additionally, the social worker also began monitoring the catadores and provided ad hoc public 
health training to encourage the use of personal protective equipment when sorting the waste. 
At its height, AMJG reportedly supported 5,000 catadores within the landfill site itself. Catadores 
entering the landfill during the day were given numbers for informal registration, and the entry of 
children and other vulnerable populations were prohibited and extremely limited. With this 
system, catadores mostly worked in two shifts during the day. At night, however, the landfill was 
“a no man’s land”: without the monitoring of COMLURB or the contracted management 
company, the landfill was again open to all and drug traffickers and criminals ruled supreme 
(Interviewee 5, 2013).  
 
Aterro Sanitário: 2005 – 2012 (Sanitary Landfill) 
 
Figure 4. Diagram of Brazilian aterro sanitário Sanitary Landfill (Pólita Gonçalves and author). 
By 2004, the social dynamics and organization of catadores strengthened with the formation of 
the Association of Collectors of Landfill Metropolitan Jardim Gramacho (ACAMJG). ACAMJG 
also inspired three other cooperatives to emerged from Gramacho: COOPERCAXIAS, 
COOPERJARDIM and COOPERCAMJG, which was founded as a financial arm of ACAMJG. 
Despite their internal differences and work methods, these groups were united in a common 
interest: advocating for recycling and the role of catadores in the recycling process, and the 
need for physical infrastructure support for manual recycling, such as trucks, warehouses, 
presses, and computers (IETS, 2011). 
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To supplement the sudden popularity of cooperative, associations and other catadores groups, 
the Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analyses (IBASE), a civil society focused on 
grassroots community advocacy, helped to develop a community organization to represent the 
broader group of individuals affected by the AMJG — catador and non-catador alike. This 
resulted in the formation of the Fórum Comunitário do Jardim Gramacho (Community Forum of 
Jardim Gramacho or Forum), which includes members from more than 30 different self-
organized groups related to the social and economic rights of catadores and residents affected 
by the AMJG. The forum is currently recognized as the institution that best represents the broad 
group of interests at the community and Jardim Gramacho neighborhood level (Ibid; Interviewee 
6, 2013; Interviewee 11, 2013; Workshop group interview, 2013).  
 
Despite the social and environmental interventions, improvements were not sufficient in 
addressing the grave socioeconomic and employment problems generated in the three decades 
of administrative neglect with the landfill and the neighborhood of Jardim Gramacho. The 
recovery and new technical operations on the landfill were also unable to indefinitely delay its 
exhaustion, as the site had already surpassed its physical constraints and expected lifetime. 
Although COMLURB had been trying to resolve the growing problem of MSWM in Rio de 
Janeiro and find alternatives to AMJG as a final disposal site since the mid-1990s, in 2004 
COMLURB and the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro officially announced their intent to begin 
decommissioning the site and replace the AMJG with another final destination for solid waste.  
 
At the same time, the municipality of Duque de Caxias, which had been illegally dumping MSW 
at Gramacho, initiated a series of attempts to close AMJG and impede its operations. In 2005, 
Mayor Washington Reis de Oliveira instituted an Environmental Restoration Fee to be charged 
for all waste disposal vehicles entering Gramacho, including the COMLURB. The price of the 
collection would be based on the number of axles of each waste disposal vehicle. Weeks after 
the regulatory law was in place, the Caxias Mayor closed the landfill, on ground that COMLURB 
refused to pay the newly imposed fee. COMLURB claimed that Caxias them more in payment 
for the large amount of waste Caxias had been dumping illegally for free throughout AMJG’s 
operation. This closure was short and resulted in legal disputes between the municipality of 
Caxias, responsible for neighborhood Jardim Gramacho, and COMLURB, responsible for the 
AMJG landfill and formally owns the land on which the landfill is located (Ibid; Interviewee 2, 
2013). While the municipality of Rio de Janeiro still owns the site and manages its operation 
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through COMLURB, numerous disagreements and political in-fighting between Rio and Caxias 
regarding social, environmental, and financial responsibilities pertaining to the physical site, 
catadores, and the MSWM of the region occurred through AMJG’s official closure in 2012. This 
political competition still plays a pivotal role today regarding the future of Jardim Gramacho. 
 
CATADORES + NON-CATADOR RESIDENTS OF JARDIM GRAMACHO 
 
From analysis of research compiled from three previous studies, and observations from site 
visits conducted in March 2013, it is clear that Jardim Gramacho has a great deficit of basic 
infrastructure and services far below the average in the Rio metropolitan area. Catadores and 
other households living in the slums on top of the mangrove swamps reside in precarious 
structures, with some constructed out of cardboard and thin scrap wood. The largest slums 
adjacent to AMJG are the Comunidade da Paz / Maruim, Parque Planetário, and the Favela do 
Esqueleto labeled in green in Figure 5 below. These areas are severely deprived, and still lack 
access to sanitation, water, and electricity. Approximately 30% of Jardim Gramacho residents, 
for example, lack access to water and sanitation, and more than half of those with access are 
supplied with water only 2-3 times a week. Moreover, only 50% of Gramacho household have 
plumbing and adequate sanitation, compared to 99% of households in Rio state (IETS, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 5. Jardim Gramacho neighborhood map with nodes (Google map 2012 with author labels). 
Although the neighborhood of Jardim Gramacho has been economically dependent on the 
landfill and activities of the catadores since its inception, the majority of its approximate 13,700 
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residents are not catadores. Previous research on the neighborhood has shown a range of 
between 10-60% of the population relying directly on waste picking for livelihood throughout 
AMJG’s lifespan. In a 2011 socioeconomic study, only 1,190 Gramacho residents — less than 
10% of the population — identified themselves as catadores. More than 3,590 people, however, 
live in households with at least one catador, with 14% of households relying on waste picking as 
the main source of livelihood (Ibid). Despite the significant impact the AMJG closure, catadores 
cooperatives associations, and the waste-to-energy CDM proposal have had on the 
neighborhood and Duque de Caxias municipality as a whole, it is nevertheless critical to 
examine the needs and characteristics of all Jardim Gramacho residents, catador and not-
catador alike.  
 
The Jardim Gramacho population is significantly younger than that of Rio de Janeiro, placing 
them at the lowest level of socioeconomic development in the state. Over 30% of the Jardim 
Gramacho population is between 5-19 years of age, with approximately 20% of residents 
between the ages of 20-29. Catadores households are even younger, as approximately 70% of 
individuals living with a catador are below the age of 29. Average household size is about four, 
and more than half of households have children (Ibid). This indicates a great need for childcare, 
primary education and public health services for children, provisions that are currently not fully 
met by the municipality of Caxias.  
 
Additionally, literacy rates are low throughout the population, as only 10% of adults are illiterate 
— compared to 4% average in Rio state – and only 20% have a high school competency. The 
situation is worse among catadores: 50% of catadores completed less than four years of school, 
making them functionally illiterate, and 20% received no education (Ibid). 
 
Households with catadores are more vulnerable in all socioeconomic and physical indicators, 
including access to basic infrastructure, poverty rate, education level, work conditions and 
wages. The median per capital household income was approximately R$300-3708 a month in 
2011 (IETS, 2011; Interviewee 1, 2013; Interviewee 2, 2013) with about 42% of the population 
of the district is living below the poverty line and 18% in extreme poverty (IETS, 2011).  
 
                                                
8 Wages earned by catadores reported ranged from R$100 per day, at the highest, to “average” monthly incomes of 
R$300, R$350 and R$1,200 discussed in interviews (Interviewee 1, 2013; Interviewee 2, 2013). Median monthly 
incomes of R$300 and R$370 were stated as representative of the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood from the Forum 
as well as independent research studies (IETS, 2011; Interviewee 10, 2013; Workshop group interview, 2013).  
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The socioeconomic diagnosis of Jardim Gramacho, conducted in 2010-2011 by the Institute of 
Research on Labor and Society (IETS), contains the most recent data on the income and social 
conditions faced by Gramacho residents and catadores, and is also the only dataset available 
on the projected effects of the landfill closure. IETS was commissioned by the Rio State 
Secretary of the Environment (SEA) to inform the government on socioeconomic interventions 
and compensation measures needed following the closure of AMJG. In the report, IETS 
projected that the closure of the landfill, and thus elimination of catadores livelihoods, would 
produce the following immediate impacts on neighborhood residents: 
 
• Reduce the per capita income of all Gramacho residents by one-third (R$311 to R$101 
per month); 
• Increase the population living below the poverty level from 50%–87 and; 
• Nearly quadruple the population living in extreme poverty from 18%–68%. 
 
In addition to the quantifiable demographics and other data described above, it is critical to also 
note the following points gathered from interviews with neighborhood residents, catadores 
cooperative members, and through personal observations at the site: 
 
•  “Community” factions: 
There is a distinct lack of “community” in Jardim Gramacho, arguably due to its formation 
as an informal settlement dependent on landfill activities and the many decades of 
social, economic, infrastructural, and government neglect. Many in the neighborhood 
were keen on making a clear distinction between non-catador residents and catadores 
when identifying themselves and their various needs. Some non-catador residents 
expressed animosity towards some catadores groups for having received compensation. 
Additionally, there is noticeable competition and conflicting interests among the many 
different catadores associations and cooperatives, with underlying power struggles for 
public and private funding. Overall, there is a significant lack of solidarity at the 
neighborhood level. Efforts are being made by the Forum, IETS, IBASE and others at 
forming a stronger “community” among these different groups, especially in light of the 
landfill closure and the neighborhood’s new modes of economic activity and 
employment. These community organizing efforts will be essential to ensure the success 
of future master plans and community revitalization projects that are currently under 
discussion. 
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• Illegal waste disposal: 
Illegal dumping of MSW and other unidentifiable garbage outside the AMJG perimeter 
has been exacerbated since its closure. Disposal trucks from neighboring municipalities, 
along with private disposal companies, openly dump in vacant lots, street corners, and 
adjacent to residential housing and restaurants throughout the Jardim Gramacho 
neighborhood. This is a great concern to both catador and resident populations for their 
heath and well-being as well as for neighborhood redevelopment and new housing and 
urban design projects. 
 
• Drug trafficking: 
As previously mentioned, drug trafficking still persists throughout the neighborhood, and 
drug lords who dominated the catadores and AMJG social structure still play a significant 
role in Gramacho today. Drug gangs informally control some of the activities in area, 
blocking certain streets and intimidating some catadores cooperatives. Neighborhood 
residents — both catadores and non-catadores — have voiced concerns about crime 
and safety issues for daily life as well as business and entrepreneurial activities. This 
remains to be a huge problem in Jardim Gramacho, and the lack of municipal control 
and policing of the area prevents full socioeconomic development of the area.  
   
• Police / Security:  
There is a noticeable lack of police or guards near the landfill and within the 
neighborhood, exacerbating the problems of illegal waste dumping and rampant drug 
trafficking in the area. The nearest police station is reportedly 40 minutes away (IETS, 
2011). The lack of crime enforcement by the city severely hampers socioeconomic 
improvements in the neighborhood and is a great disincentive for attracting business 
investments and operations in the area.  
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VI. GRAMACHO LANDFILL GAS CDM PROJECT  
 
COMLURB progressed in their plans to ultimately decommission AMJG and replace it with 
another, more technologically advanced and better equipped landfill facility elsewhere. 
Beginning in 2004, COMLURB worked with several advisors and NGOs including the World 
Bank, IDB and the United Nations on proposals to completely close and cap the landfill for 
biogas waste-to-energy operations as a Carbon Development Mechanism (CDM) project. 
Although AMJG never functionally closed during this period and the amount of waste disposed 
was not limited, COMLURB carried through with the CDM proposal slowly, following technical 
and feasibility analysis and recommendations made by the World Bank and others. The final 
concession and contractual agreement for the Gramacho Landfill Gas CDM Project was made 
in 2007 between COMLURB and Novo Gramacho Energia Ambiental SA, winner of the public 
bid responsible for managing the landfill closure, biogas waste-to-energy construction, and 
further neighborhood monitoring for 15 years after closure.  
 
EMPLOYMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 
 
Prior to the contract between COMLURB and Novo Gramacho, an agreement was signed 
between COMLURB and the Caxias Prefeitura in 2006, represented by then Mayor Washington 
Reis de Oliveira. This agreement acknowledged that the amount of landfill gas generated by 
AMJG at present, without closure or decommission, is more than sufficient for biogas waste-to-
energy conversion required for CDM. In partnership to close and convert the landfill for CDM, 
COMLURB committed to direct a portion of CER (carbon credit) profits for the Neighborhood 
Enhancement of Jardim Gramacho Fund and annual payments to the Fund for Catadores of 
AMJG over 15 years. The former would pay for physical infrastructure investments — including 
roads, municipal buildings, and small environmental remediation improvements — and the latter 
would subsidize the livelihoods and skills training for catadores, with specific uses to be 
determined by the Caxias Prefeitura in conjunction with the local residents and catadores. Both 
funds would be paid for by COMLURB through CER sales and managed by the Caxias 
Prefeitura (IETS and Ramos, 2011).  
 
The agreement explicitly links funding for both infrastructure and employment measures with the 
biogas extraction, conversion, and CER sales. Again, it is important to note the following three 
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commitments and responsibilities of the Caxias Prefeitura as outlined in 2006 contract between 
the Rio and Caxias municipalities (Ibid):  
 
(a) Establish the Neighborhood Enhancement of Jardim Gramacho Fund in order to 
implement basic infrastructure, sanitation and urban planning to improve quality of life 
population of the neighborhood; 
(b) Establish the Fund for Catadores of AMJG that support alternative employment and 
equitable livelihoods for the Gramacho catadores; 
(c) Organize, monitor, and manage the execution of actions and uses for both funds. 
 
These commitments lay the groundwork for COMLURB’s 2007 contract with Novo Gramacho. 
Interviews with key stakeholders familiar with COMLURB’s public bid process attributed Novo 
Gramacho’s win to the generous compensation they offered for both the Neighborhood 
Enhancement and Catadores funds (Interviewee 2, 2013; Interviewee 6, 2013). Excerpts 
highlighting the administration of the funds are summarized below: 
 
 
Neighborhood Enhancement of Jardim Gramacho Fund 
Contract Clause Commitment 
7.1 Novo Gramacho has pledged to give 36%, with variable interest, the "rights 
arising from AMJG GHG emissions reductions that may be obtained by the 
concessionaire." Of this 36%, 50% will be given to COMLURB and the 
remaining 50% to the Fund for the Enhancement of neighborhood Jardim 
Gramacho. 
7.1.2 The "rights from AMJG GHG emissions reductions obtained by the 
concessionaire" are those arising from any use/sale of biogas, or 
potentially recovered from AMJG, by Novo Gramacho or third parties. 
7:15 The remuneration for the Neighborhood Enhancement Fund will be 
transferred immediately, when obtained by Novo Gramacho. 
8.24 The Neighborhood Enhancement Fund will be administered by the 
municipality of Duque de Caxias with the scope of urban and 
environmental recovery of the district surrounding AMJG. 
Figure 6. Translation by author from Contract No. 155/2007 between COMLURB and Novo Gramacho. 
  
Fund for Catadores of AMJG 
Contract Clause Commitment 
7.2 Novo Gramacho is required to deposit a fixed annual remuneration of 
R$1.2 million (adjusted annually according to the expanded Consumer 
Price Index) for 15 years to the Fund for Catadores of AMJG. This 
remuneration shall be due immediately upon closure of AMJG. 
7.2.1 The remuneration applicable to the Catadores Fund must be paid 
annually within 30 days of the anniversary date of the issuance of the 
AMJG Statement of Closure. 
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7.24 The Fund for Catadores of AMJG will be managed by entities 
representing the AMJG catadores, with oversight by civil society 
organizations with the scope of "creating alternative employment and 
income for catadores" after the closure of the landfill. 
Figure 7. Translation by author from Contract No. 155/2007 between COMLURB and Novo Gramacho. 
 
CARBON DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROPOSAL   
 
The CDM approval process to obtain CERs (Certified Emissions Reductions) is as follows 
(UNFCCC, 2009; UNFCCC, 2012):  
 
(a) Novo Gramacho and COMLURB must first submit a Project Design Document (PDD) 
detailing technical engineering, calculations of emissions reductions, environmental 
and social benefits to be obtained by the project; 
(b) PDD methodology must be approved by Designated Operational Entity (DOE): 
Société Générale de Surveillance United Kingdom Limited; 
(c) Project is then validated by the Designated National Authority (DNA) in the host 
country: the Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change (CIMGC), which 
is composed of members from various Brazilian federal executive agencies;  
(d) The DNA must submit copies of the PDD for public comment to the following 
stakeholders: Municipality of Duque de Caxias, the Board Aldermen of Duque de 
Caxias, State Foundation for Engineering and Environment, State Secretary of the 
Environment, Brazilian Forum of NGOs and Social Movements for the Environment 
and Development, Prosecutor of the State of Rio de Janeiro, federal prosecutors, 
and the ACAMJG catadores association;  
(e) The Project is then registered with the CDM Executive Board; 
(f) Novo Gramacho must monitored the project with periodical reports to the CDM 
board;  
(g) The DOE must verify reductions in GHG emissions as proposed in the PDD;  
(h) And finally, the CDM Executive Board issues CERs (carbon credits) that can be sold 
by Novo Gramacho in the carbon market. 
 
COMLURB and Novo Gramacho began completing drafts of the PDD, with the support of the 
World Bank, in 2004. The final PDD, entitled “Gramacho Landfill Gas Project,” was validated by 
the UNFCCC in July 2006 and registered with the CDM board in August 2008. The AMJG 
closure date and start of biogas extraction activities was listed on the PDD as December 31, 
2009. In addition to profits from sales of CERs, the PDD was originally developed with the 
business model of selling the biogas fuel captured and converted from AMJG to the Grupo 
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Peixoto de Castro – Chemistry (GPC-Chemistry) methanol production plant located about 25 km 
from AMJG. Clean biogas produced by the Novo Gramacho plant would allow GPC-Chemistry 
to replace their natural gas consumption with a renewable energy source. The PDD also 
specified the use of CER profits for the infrastructure and employment funds previously 
mentioned: “The CERs issued for the project will be used partially to finance the urban recovery 
of the landfill surroundings (Jardim Gramacho district). Moreover, Novo Gramacho will donate 
an annual contribution to a special purpose fund aimed to train the people who lives nowadays 
from picking the waste during its disposal in the landfill” (UNFCCC, 2009). No comments were 
made by any of the stakeholders presented with the PDD for review over the period of 
September – October 2008. 
 
 
Figure 8. Estimates from UNFCCC Project Design Document on projected emissions reductions (2009). 
 
While a few alterations have been made in the four years since the PDD was approved and 
registered with the CDM Executive board, it is important to note the following: 
 
• The Role of CDM and UNFCCC on Local Employment 
The CDM board, UNFCCC, or other international actors were not involved in the 
proposal or negotiations for the Neighborhood Enhance and Catadores Funds 
committed by COMLURB and Novo Gramacho. The CDM program as it stands does 
not make explicit employment or local socioeconomic stipulations on project 
participants, beyond general benefits to “local sustainable development”. The 
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commitments to the funds were negotiated by the local municipalities, though it 
should be noted that COMLURB and Novo Gramacho believed such commitments 
enhanced the “sustainability” of their proposal, giving them a competitive advantage 
for CDM approval (Interviewee 1, 2013; Interviewee 2, 2013; Interviewee 9, 2013).  
 
• Social Commitments as Outlined in the CDM PDD 
Specifics on the amount, disbursement, use and management of the funds were not 
outlined in the PDD, although they remain in the agreement between COMLURB and 
the Caxias Prefeitura signed in 2006. Moreover, there is no monitoring or evaluation 
requirement for the social commitments, despite the CDM Executive Board’s strict 
requirements for third-party evaluations of the GHG emissions calculations and 
technical feasibility of the project.   
 
• Foreign Technology Transfer 
Brazilian biogas technology and engineering firms were deemed unfit at the time by 
the CDM and UNFCCC review to implement a project of this scale. Approval of the 
PDD stipulated that “technology will have to come from abroad and mainly from the 
United States and Europe. Hence technology transfer will occur from countries with 
strict environmental legislative requirements and environmentally sound 
technologies” (UNFCCC, 2009).  
 
• Stakeholder / Public Consultation  
No comments were made by the stakeholder groups presented with the translated 
PDD in the one-month public consultation window set by the CDM framework and 
the Brazilian DNA agencies. However, it is important to note that of the 9 stakeholder 
groups presented with the information described above, only one was a 
neighborhood-level group (ACAMJG). None of the Jardim Gramacho catadores or 
residents interviewed for this thesis recalled being informed of this public 
consultation and commentary process, and most dismissed the CDM project details 
as too technical for their understanding.   
 
• Closure and Delays 
Novo Gramacho is only able to fully extract, convert, deliver and sell biogas and 
CERs after the closure of AMJG and its waste disposal activities. While December 
31, 2009 was stated on the PDD for the closure of AMJG, the site was not closed 
until on June 3, 2012. This delay of over 30 months greatly impacted both the 
contract with GPC-Chemistry and the projected sales of biogas and CERs.  
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The delay in AMJG closure and Novo Gramacho construction caused many issues in for 
implementation of the CDM proposal. The US EPA, through the JIUS program (Joint Initiative on 
Urban Sustainability) and with the support of the US Import-Export Bank, helped to coordinate 
the construction of the biogas facility and refinement technology. FirmGreen, an American clean 
energy firm based in Newport Beach, California, was selected for the technology transfer. While 
the contract with FirmGreen was solidified in 2010, construction could not be done until 2012 
due to the active waste disposal and waste picking at AMJG. This also hampered original plans 
with GPC-Chemistry, the proposed buyer of biogas.   
 
As a result of the delay, Novo Gramacho and COMLURB altered the original proposal for a new 
biogas buyer. In the current scheme, biogas would be piped and sold to Reduc, the Duque de 
Caxias oil refinery owned by Petrobras, Brazil’s state-owned petroleum company and the largest 
corporation in Rio de Janeiro state. This distribution scheme was projected to reduce GHG 
emissions by 1,400 tons per year, and also provide Reduc with 10% of the plant’s thermal 
energy needs. The profits from combined biogas and CER sales were projected to be about 
R$250 million over 15 years. As this projection was made prior to the fall of the carbon credit 
market, requests for official estimates in light of market changes went unanswered. Interviews 
with key stakeholders indicate that about 90% of estimated R$250 million was based on biogas 
sales to Reduc, not CERs (Interviewee 9, 2013); however, this statement could not be verified 
with other sources due to the lack of public information available and requested on these new 
calculations.  
 
CLOSURE + COMPENSATION IN THE EVE OF RIO+20 
 
By mid-April 2011, AMJG received approximately 9.5 million tons of municipal solid waste per 
day, 75% of which was from Rio de Janeiro and 25% from the neighboring municipalities (see 
Figure 9 below). The landfill had received more than 60 million tons of waste throughout its 
lifespan, with the covered waste mound exceeding 130 feet (40 meters) in height. MSW 
previously disposed at Gramacho was to be transferred to COMLURB’s new Central Waste 
Treatment in Seropédica, opened in 2011 with full sanitary facilities and measures in place. 
Despite the multiple closure attempts by COMLURB and the Rio Prefeitura in the mid-1990s 
and again in 2009, the final closure of AMJG for the biogas CDM project was pushed back 
numerous times between 2010 –2012, ending three weeks before the start of the Rio+20 
conference.  
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Figure 9. AMJG waste streams prior to its closure 2011--2012 (author). 
On June 3, 2012, the Municipal Landfill of Jardim Gramacho was officially closed, with a 
celebration ceremony attended by Rio Prefeitura Mayor Eduardo Paes, Rio State Secretary of 
the Environment Carlos Minc, along with members of the Caxias Prefeitura, COMLURB, Novo 
Gramacho, Community Forum of Jardim Gramacho and key figures from multiple catadores 
cooperatives. The scene was portrayed as a great accomplishment made by the Rio de Janeiro 
city and municipal region for finally putting an end to the great human and environmental 
disaster caused by decades of pollution and undignified livelihoods (Interviewee 1, 3, 16; 2013). 
 
While there were many factors influencing the closure date and negotiations — including the 
federal PNRC legislation (National Policy on Solid Waste) to close all open dump landfill sites 
with catadores by 2014 — the two most important catalysts cited in stakeholder interviews were 
the encroaching Rio+20 conference and Mayor Eduardo Paes’s reelection campaign later that 
year. Both were also intrinsically linked to the international image projected by the Rio 
Prefeitura, and by reflection, Mayor Paes. Building his legacy as the mayor who won the 
Olympic bid for his city, Paes had cited the closure of the “Jardim Gramacho environmental 
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disaster” as one of his major accomplishments in his 2012 reelection campaign. The additional 
embarrassment of hosting the world’s biggest sustainable development conference with the 
continent’s largest garbage dump festering in his backyard was too politically costly. AMJG had 
to be closed prior to the Rio+20 Conference in mid-June, and compensation for catadores 
needed to be implemented prior to Election Day in October (Interviewee 1, 2, 19; 2013).   
 
The Rio Prefeitura placed significant pressure on COMLURB and Novo Gramacho to manage 
the closure and implement the funds committed, with the hope of completing the process by 
2011. Negotiations with the other municipalities, 
namely Caxias, on the use, transfer, and pricing 
of other landfill facilities slightly delayed the 
closure. But from mid-late 2011 through mid-
2012, lack of agreements with local catadores, 
catador groups and non-catador residents 
suspended the closure efforts. In negotiations 
with COMLURB and Novo Gramacho, 
unorganized and independent catadores had 
conflicting interests with the organized catadores 
associations and cooperatives, many of whom 
further were conflicted with each other. A few catadores associations, namely the ACAMJG, 
were in favor of the collective Fund to be managed by the Caxias Prefeitura and allocated by the 
joint committee. The majority, however, refuted this option, citing inequities due to infamous 
corruption9 of the Caxias Prefeitura and the biases of ACAMJG and other groups selected to be 
on the committee governing the uses and allocation of the fund. Despite multiple community 
meetings with COMLURB and technical assistance from IETS and other local NGOs, the 
negotiation was temporarily halted pending alternatives to a more accountable management of 
the fund (Interviewees 6, 8, 12; 2013).  
 
In early May 2012, Eduardo Paes and the Rio mayor’s office organized a community meeting 
with Gramacho catadores and residents. Although he had not participated in the process prior, 
                                                
9 The Caxias Prefeitura and elected policymakers in 2010 and 2011 were accused of multiple corruption 
charges in the local news, with the Secretary most closely involved in waste management and 
environmental issues the most infamous of the administration. That administration changed with a newly 
elected mayor in 2013.  
1,700+ CATADORES EMPLOYED
9,500 TPD 
waste 3,325 TPD (35%)are recyclables 
45% informally
recycled on-site
~350 acres with 9,500 tons of waste / day
from 11.8 mil residents in Rio metro area
Figure 10. AMJG activities in 2011-2012 (author). 
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Paes surprised COMLURB and Novo Gramacho by holding a press conference at Gramacho to 
propose an alternative to the catadores: one open, democratic vote to determine how they 
would like the R$22 million compensation to be distributed. Choices offered were reportedly 
payments in installments of 3, 5, or 15 over the 15 year period; the Fund to be managed by the 
Caxias Prefeitura and allocated by a committee of their peers; and one single, lump sum 
payment. A vote was held in mid-May, during which the catadores voted overwhelmingly for the 
single payment option (Interviewees 1, 2, 6; 2013).  
 
The final compensation was about R$14,000 per person paid to 1,700 registered catadores by 
COMLURB through the Rio Prefeitura treasury. This amount did not account for net present 
value, and Paes agreed to have the Rio Prefeitura pay for interest, as the R$22 million initially 
proposed was to be paid over a 15 year period. COMLURB would be reimbursed for the 
compensation through the annual CERs and biogas sales from Novo Gramacho. The payment 
was distributed through bank accounts established by Caixa Econômica, Brazil’s federal reserve 
bank, in the name of catadores who registered on the compensation list and completed paper 
work with COMLURB and Novo Gramacho.  
 
This process was met with mixed reviews. Some catadores found the registration process overly 
bureaucratic and unjust, with long lines and lack of support in completing paperwork for 
individuals with low literacy rates unaccustomed to such procedures (Interviewee 12, 2013; 
Interviewee 13, 2013). Others criticized the “intentional” lack of enforcement by COMLURB and 
the Rio Prefeitura, claiming that many leaders of cooperatives simply registered all of their 
family and friends to collect the compensation even though they did not technically work in the 
landfill (Interviewee 11, 2013; Interviewee 14, 2013). The one-time payment also reportedly 
resulted in tragic anecdotes of many catadores who were robbed of their compensation or spent 
all of it immediately on consumer goods, and are now homeless and without savings or 
employment. Other tragic cases were reported as well, with catadores who died from motorcycle 
accidents and drug overdoses purchased with the compensation money (Interviewee 1, 8, 10; 
2013). 
 
The opinions from the city and civil society researchers on the compensation process was more 
unified: although they admitted their own biases in finding it a poor choice for the long-term 
social and economic well-being of the catadores, they found the final solution indicative of 
“direct democracy” that fulfilled the desires of the vast majority of catadores (Interviewee 1, 3, 6, 
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7, 16; 2013). Despite the attempts of a few local NGOs and researchers to mediate the 
negotiations for the compensation fund, many outside the neighborhood believed that 
“catadores sealed their own fate” in selecting the lump sum option over skills training, 
investment education, employment, or other social services that could have been more effective 
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VII. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter highlights the interests and influences of main stakeholder groups, as discussed in 




As discussed in multiple interviews with individuals at the international, municipal, and 
neighborhood level, the role of international NGOs and mult-lateral organizations is extremely 
limited. The following conclusions were made from the data collectioned:  
 
• The UNFCCC and CDM “sustainable development” framework did not limit local 
municipalities from setting and meeting their own objectives. 
• The CDM framework does not include specific requirements for local economic 
development or employment measures, though the municipal actors in this case made 
their own commitments to these causes.  
• Many interviewees cited the timing of Rio+20 as a major influence in the landfill closure 
and compensation process that was ultimately enacted. However, stakeholders also 
disagreed on level of influence Rio+20 had, as it was the timing of the conference as 
interpreted by the Rio Prefeitura, and not the commitments or recommendations made 
by the UN, that influenced the final resolution.  
• Technical analysis and expertise from World Bank and IDB studies were used to develop 
the CDM proposal and guide environmental remediation plans. State, municipal and 
local actors saw no further influences by these groups. While the World Bank10 
publicized its role in distributing a large donation from the Government of Japan toward 
catadores employment initiatives, funds were reportedly distributed to Caxias at the 
federal level and local actors were unaware of any such gift.  
• While the EPA also publized its involvement in the Novo Gramacho proposal, many local 
actors within the Rio Prefeitura and Caxias Prefeitura were unaware of their role or even 
interest in this project. Through the JIUS program, the EPA attempted to help faciliate 
the technology transfer and other social enterprise investment in Gramacho, in addition 
to providing case study and reference materials for interested parties. No work was 
directly implemented or funded by the EPA, other than preliminary research.    
                                                
10 The World Bank was unavaliable for comment about its work related to Gramacho. 
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BRAZILIAN FEDERAL POLICIES + PROGRAMS 
 
While interviewees cited Brazilian federal legislation and agencies more often in conversation 
than those of international scale, further analysis of the scenario indicate that federal actors also 
had a small, limited role.  
 
• Federal legislation on solid waste management (PNRS) and climate change mitigation 
(PNMC) passed in 2010 has placed greater pressures on local municipalities to comply 
by higher environmental standards. However, these policies have minimal effect on the 
Jardim Gramacho socioeconomic and employment situation as plans for closing the 
landfill and subsequent compensation efforts were made prior to their ratification.  
• While there is potential that greater support for federal ministries and funding sources, 
namely Caxias and BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), could rectify some of the 
infrastructural, social service and employment needs in Gramacho, these institutions 
show no real interest in Gramacho interventions at this time.   
 
RIO DE JANEIRO STATE 
 
There is a current lack of inter-municipal and regional planning authority, or any process or 
program that incentivizes municipalities in the metropolitan region to coordinate and partner on 
inter-municipal services and needs such as waste management. While the Rio Prefeitura has a 
few initiatives in partnership with other municipalities, these are made at an ad hoc basis only. 
COMLURB serves as one of the few agencies that is forced to unofficially work in this capacity, 
with mixed reviews on their success in doing so. Regional planning, furthermore, is difficult in all 
contexts and can require significant political will to align differing municipal politics and 
administrations.  
 
All of this serves as significant cause for the State Government of Rio de Janeiro to play a more 
active and influential role in issues of waste management and inter-municipal conflicts and 
challenges that arose with Jardim Gramacho. Stakeholders at the municipal and neighborhood 
level, in both government and civil society, lamented the weak role of Rio state with regard to 
AMJG. 
 
• Actors from the Rio Prefeitura hoped that the state could have done more to organize 
inter-municipal waste management and conflicts between municipalities on landfill site 
selection; waste disposal; payment and maintenance; environmental and social 
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remediation; etc. Moreover, the state should better enforce policies preventing illegal 
waste dumping, which remains a big problem in the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood 
after the landfill closure. 
• Actors from the Caxias Prefeitura criticized the lack of state funding and support on 
waste management, infrastructural, and socioeconomic support for Jardim Gramacho. 
• Since the closure, the state through the SEA (State Secretary of the Environment) has 
collaborated on a few, small-scale employment and skills training programs in 
partnership with local groups and private firms. This includes a recycling facility and 
technical training center for catadores. While there is potential for these programs to 
make a positive impact on the neighborhood, the current size and scope of these 
operations could only benefit 20% of the catadores population at most. 
 
MUNICIPAL PLAYERS  
 
The conflicts between the Caxias Prefeitura and the Rio Prefeitura are emblematic of the 
governance and political in-fighting problems at both the municipal and neighborhood level. On 
the one hand, Rio is a more wealthy, powerful, and polluting city with greater capacity for 
governance and technical implementation. Since Rio owns and manages AMJG, and has been 
responsible for 70-80% of the waste dumped at the site over the last 30 years, many believe 
that Rio should be responsible for the social, environmental, employment and infrastructural 
remediation of Jardim Gramacho.  
 
On the other, the Rio Prefeitura has opted for the closure of AMJG since the early 1990s. The 
two decades of delay could be attributed to Caxias’s lack of its own municipal waste 
management plan, and refusal to develop or pay for an alternate landfill. Moreover, Caxias is 
the second wealthiest municipality in Rio state, behind the City of Rio, and one of the most 
corrupt as well. The lack of infrastructure in the slums and immediate neighborhood surrounding 
the landfill, in addition to the lack of police, security, and other basic social services are among 
the most fundamental responsibilities of the Caxias municipality.  
 
The over three decades of neglect experienced by the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood resulted 
from political conflicts between the municipalities, with one municipality pushing responsibilities 
of a complex problem onto another, until it was finally impossible to ignore. Perspectives on 
specific actors are also summarized below: 
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• As previously mentioned, Mayor Paes was the catalyst in the ultimate closure of the 
landfill and negotiation. A popular and charismatic policymaker with international 
celebrity status, Paes was very politically savvy in giving a “democratic vote” to the 
catadores as a means of resolution. With his own interests resting on the upcoming 
election and his future political career, the process and resolution he put in place gave 
the catadores more funding than originally committed. Arguments can be made on both 
sides regarding the equity of the democratic vote and single payment solution, though its 
swift efficiency is clear. 
• COMLURB stands essentially as another arm of the Rio Prefeitura, and ultimately in this 
case, as an agent of the Mayor. Interests and influences are mixed among COMLURB 
employees. Most do not feel that the outcome was ideal for catadores, though they are 
united with the SMMA and SMC (Municipal Secretary of the Environment and 
Conservation and Municipal Secretary of Public Utilities, respectively) on being content 
to no longer manage the complex challenges of appeasing the Gramacho catadores. 
The majority is also dismissive of the roles and interests of the Caxias Prefeitura and Rio 
state government, citing the Rio Prefeitura and COMLURB as the actors who were most 
beneficial and caring for the catadores population.   
• It is important to note that in discussions with the various agencies within the Rio 
Prefeitura, including COMLURB, interviewees did not differentiate between the 
catadores and non-catador residents in Gramacho, revealing a bias for the catadores.  
• Additionally, a few within COMLURB felt that keeping Gramacho open would have been 
in the best interest of the catadores, arguing that it was and remains the best livelihood 
option for that population. 
• Local NGOs and civil society groups were more politically neutral, though they agreed 
with previous analysis on the disparity between the capacity of the Rio Prefeitura and the 
Caxias Prefeitura, and the problems stemming from their political conflicts.  
• It should be noted that NGOs interviewed advocated for welfare of the Jardim Gramacho 
neighborhood as a whole. While these groups were in seemingly good terms with all of 
the major catadores associations and cooperatives, they aligned themselves with the 
needs and desires of the Forum for its more fair representation of the community as 
opposed to picking a single winner among the catadores groups.   
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JARDIM GRAMACHO NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
The lack of solidarity and politics at the neighborhood level — between catadores and non-
catadores as well as among competing catadores groups — severely hampered their ability to 
negotiate with the municipalities and other actors. Several small initiatives were developed by 
foundations and private firms to fund equipment, training and other employment needs of a few 
catadores cooperatives in response to the popularity of Vik Muniz’s 2010 Academy Award 
nominated documentary, Waste Land. ACAMJG, highlighted in Muniz’s film, received particular 
attention for their marketability, and was selected as a “winner” by the Coca-Cola Foundation 
and others for the focus of Corporate Social Responsibility and other campaigns. While the 
contributions were insignificant in creating visible change in the employment and welfare of the 
AMJG catadores as a whole, it prompted the formation of multiple cooperatives, many of which 
were formed and limited to single catadores households. ACAMJG, in addition to many other 
cooperatives, have closed memberships, providing services and resources to a very limited 
group and creating suspicion among others in the neighborhood. Many residents and local 
NGOs interviewed have voiced concerns over the distribution of such resources among friends 
and family of the cooperatives only. Moreover, competition and varying ideologies among these 
cooperatives further complicate possible collaboration and political organization among these 
groups.  
 
There is also a vocal group of catadores who did not wish to be organized prior to the 
compensation negotiations, as well as non-catador residents who felt their needs most 
neglected in the negotiations and compromise. While many of the non-organized catadores 
were forced to informally organize for many of the large community meetings, their agency and 
influence remain low and mostly unaccounted for. The municipal and state governments, 
perhaps for the ease of argument, favored catadores cooperatives and ACAMJG in particular in 
many of these negotiations. This is one of the main reasons why collective negotiation failed 
prior to the one payment solution: most felt that the Joint Committee that was to be given the 
ability to allocate the use of the compensation Fund would never be able to justly represent the 
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More than three decades of extreme social, economic and environmental neglect left the Jardim 
Gramacho neighborhood without basic infrastructure and social services present in communities 
through Rio state as well as the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region. The wicked problem of the 
employment–environment tradeoff in urban sustainable development should first be discussed 
through its subcomponents outlined in Chapter 1 (p. 7): 
 
1. Is there a tradeoff between environment and local employment? 
While the Rio de Janeiro and Duque de Caxias municipal governments have allocated 
resources to address both local employment and environmental challenges present in the 
Gramacho case, current conditions point to dire lack of social welfare, security, employment 
and general access to basic services and utilities in neighborhood. Despite the remediation 
of the landfill and adjacent mangrove swamps currently underway, daily illegal waste 
dumping in Gramacho streets and open spaces have resulted in a huge environmental and 
health hazard for residents. As of March 2013, infrastructure improvements mentioned in the 
Neighborhood Enhancement Plan have not yet been implemented, as Novo Gramacho has 
not yet completed construction of the biogas distribution mechanism to the Reduc Petrobras 
refinery. Current projections state that full construction and biogas distribution is set to begin 
in mid-April 2013 (Interviewee 9, 2013). The objectives of the CDM and landfill closure 
proposal did not contain explicit employment-environment tradeoffs, though results of these 
plans and subsequent negotiations are debatable in this light. What can be argued, 
however, is that larger socioeconomic challenges — deprivation of education, police, 
utilities, and other basic infrastructural and social needs — were neglected in favor of the 
more political global of compensation for catadores. 
 
2. Who were the losers in this case? 
The non-catador residents and Jardim Gramacho neighborhood as a whole were least 
represented or benefited in the final compensation solution. None of the root causes of the 
extreme poverty and lack of employment opportunities in the neighborhood was addressed. 
Moreover, the final resolution resulted in further fractioning between neighborhood groups, 
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exacerbating the lack of community. It can also be argued that non-catador residents were 
the most excluded group, as state, municipal, and private firms and foundations focused on 
the catadores in all of their social ventures and compensation plans; and even non-
organized catadores eventually organized as an official group whose interests differed from 
the existing catadores associations and cooperatives. Individuals whose livelihoods were 
dependent on the catadores but not directly on waste picking were not eligible for the 
compensation, and did not receive any support in this process. 
 
3. Who had the power to determine the final outcome 
In contrast to the assumptions outlined in my hypothesis, the municipal and local actors in 
this scenario were most empowered in determining the final outcome. Despite the power 
struggles between COMLURB and the Rio Prefeitura with the Caxias Prefeitura, the Rio 
municipal agencies have more capacity, funding, and agency in the situation, especially as 
they own and manage the region’s largest waste disposal site. Mayor Eduardo Paes, in 
particular, was the catalyst to ultimate resolution of the “catadores problem” in the landfill 
closure process.  
 
However, the Rio Prefeitura had arguably the most to lose as well. The mayor’s political 
ambitions and capital were tied to this project — both locally in his campaign commitment to 
close Gramacho in his first term and internationally in hosting Rio+20, the FIFA World Cup 
and Summer Olympics in a “sustainable” world-class city. Additionally, COMLURB and Novo 
Gramacho’s CDM proposal and respective profits relied on the AMJG closure. The year-
and-a-half delay caused problems for the finances and operations of both companies. 
 
Paes’s one-vote solution to the lengthy negotiations between COMLURB and the Gramacho 
neighborhood regarding the catadores compensation valued efficiency and a speedy 
resolution over equity. While the catadores whose livelihoods were displaced due to the 
AMJG closure were outwardly given a “democratic” means to select their own solution, the 
fairness of this is greatly debatable. The catadores — the vast majority of whom are very 
poorly educated, low skilled, self-reliant workers — had arguable less power in submitting a 
single vote than in the previous process of directly negotiation with the municipality, and with 
the aid of NGOs moderating the process. While the latter promoted more organization and 
capacity-building among catadores groups and residents, the former negated any previously 
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established collective, political bargaining for a more self-interested, majority-rules voting 
process. 
 
ON CDM + URBAN SUSTAINABILITY 
 
The role of livelihoods and employment in the urban sustainability agenda is still fraught with 
difficulties. International actors did not play a significant role in determining the sustainability 
agenda for the Jardim Gramacho project, and the CDM framework did not privilege international 
or national actors over locals in setting and meeting local objectives in this case. However, as 
previously mentioned, the sustainable development and CDM framework also does not include 
explicit local employment criteria or metrics in the project design or evaluation. The CDM 
Executive Board issues CERs as long as the project meets technical and environmental 
regulations, and includes vague statements for additional socioeconomic and environmental 
remediation beyond the GHG emissions reductions.  
 
Moreover, the stakeholder comments phase (Section E of the PDD) currently outlined in the 
CDM approval process is lacking in any real public participation merit. Of the ten stakeholder 
groups — seemingly arbitrary determined by the host country’s Designated National Authority 
(DNA), in this case the Brazilian federal Interministerial Commission on Global Climate Change 
—only four were at the municipal level with only one from Jardim Gramacho itself. ACAMJG, the 
local civil society group selected by the DNA, represents only the select views of one faction of 
catadores and by no means the opinions of the community at large, and moreover is considered 
to one of the most polarizing and controversial groups in the neighborhood by catadores, ex-
catadores and non-catador residents. Stakeholders were only given one month for comments 
on the translation PDD, a very technical proposal with the vast majority of its 81 pages outlining 
the financial and scientific methodology by which the project was developed. It is no surprise 
that such a document did not receive any comments the stakeholder groups.  
 
While employment in the form of monetary compensation was planned and integrated into this 
project independently of CDM, the current CDM framework does not serve to meet the local 
“sustainable development” goals outlined in the Brundtland Report, Agenda 21, or the Kyoto 
Protocol, let alone the new Post-2015 UN Development Agenda. As the United Nations member 
states and other international NGOs began to debate the merits of the Kyoto Protocol and its 
renewal, key considerations should be made to amend CDM and other sustainable development 
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frameworks. In addition to the recommendations below, the UNFCCC and CDM Executive 
Board is strongly urged to review comparative international sustainability frameworks, including 
the International Finance Corporations’ (IFC) 2012 Sustainability Framework and Performance 
Standards and Guidelines. These documents define IFC’s commitments to environmental and 
social sustainability, clients’ and implementing partners’ responsibilities for managing their own 
environmental and social risks as well as commitments and procedures to ensure transparency 
and public review and disclosure of projects. Most importantly, these documents outline specific 
guidelines and procedures for clients to follow, ensuring that sustainability commitments 
achieved protect vulnerable and poor populations in a manner that is feasible for the client’s 
capacity. Performance Standard 5, which addresses Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement, should be studied in particular for its established objectives and requirements to 
avoid, minimize, and compensate/offset for risks and impacts to workers, affected communities, 
and the environment (IFC, 2012).  
 
While it is important that these international frameworks set a clear standard and procedure for 
achieving socioeconomic and environmental outcomes, it is equally important for such 
procedures to be easily adaptable to the changing contexts, capacities and needs of local 
communities, populations and implementing institutions. Sustainable development mandates 
must set clear standards and evaluation methods to ensure accountability of these goals without 
a heavy cost or burden on the implementing institutions. The following recommendations take 
these concerns and other IFC examples into account: 
 
1. Require an identification, assessment, and management system for social and 
environmental risks of the project in the CDM PDD. 
Similar to Performance Standard 1 of the IFC’s Sustainability Framework, UNFCCC and 
the CDM Executive Board should mandate that implementing partners and host 
countries conduct a thorough baseline assessment of social and environmental needs 
and impact risks. This data should then be used to develop strategies for risk mitigation 
and management to the site and affected populations, in addition to serving as the basis 
for social and environmental development objectives. Capacity of community and 
neighborhood groups must be included in this study in order to determine the most 
appropriate stakeholder and public disclosure strategies and negotiation procedures for 
resettlement and/or compensation of local populations.  
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2. Include local employment and socioeconomic development objectives as an 
explicit requirement for CDM project approval.  
The local sustainable development criteria must be enforced in the CDM framework and 
by UNFCCC through explicit local employment and socioeconomic development 
objectives required for the project to be granted CDM status. These commitments should 
be held to the same burden of proof required in the CDM PDD for biogas capture, 
conversion and sales as a means of achieving GHG emissions and other environmental 
objectives. Jobs and livelihoods displaced must be projected and accounted for in the 
proposal, in addition to other social, infrastructural and environmental needs of the 
immediate area affected by the project. These commitments should also be subject to 
approval by community-based groups and other stakeholders as described below.  
 
3. Integrate local neighborhood and community groups for stakeholder engagement 
and public approval of the project, including its local employment and 
socioeconomic development commitments. 
As stressed by the World Bank Group and the UN, stakeholder engagement is the basis 
for building strong, constructive, and responsive relationships that are essential for 
successfully managing and achieving a project's environmental and social impacts. 
Stakeholder Comments (Section E of CDM PDD) should be reformed to include more 
community-based organizations and civil society groups who can help translate the 
technical CDM details into more digestible information for local community consumption. 
Local neighborhood groups and residents must be equally represented in the 
commentary and approval process as the municipal, state, and national government 
agencies. Public meetings should be held in the community as an explicit requirement 
with municipal and state or regional government agencies to disclose the CDM proposal 
details to residents and others directly impacted by the project. This public disclosure, 
commentary and endorsement process should be used to negotiate and approve the 
employment and socioeconomic objectives as proposed by the implementing parties. 
This public consultation and approval process must also be subject to official CDM 
Executive Board approval as an integral part of the project methodology on par with 
technical specifications and emissions calculations. 
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4. Incorporate local stakeholder negotiation and public approval process as explicit 
project implementation costs to be compensated by CER sales. 
The CDM framework should recognize and build in explicit time, capacity-building and 
labor costs for the negotiation and approval process with local stakeholders into the 
project design. In order to achieve the local socioeconomic and global environmental 
benefits as stated in its mission, the CDM framework must account for this important 
element as a necessary step in every project to minimize negative impacts on the 
affected area and populations, and provide suitable compensation. This step should be 
integrated in the project implementation timeline, with negotiation costs assumed by 
local municipalities and civil society groups included in project implementation budget. 
 
5. Monitor and evaluate CDM projects for commitments on both GHG emissions 
reductions, and local employment and socioeconomic development. 
The CDM project should be continuously monitored and evaluated based on the local 
employment and development as well as GHG reduction metrics and objectives outlined 
in the proposal. The third party evaluation of the GHG reduction metrics and other 
technical feasibility aspects currently mandated by the CDM process should be extended 
to capture the social and employment aspects of the sustainable development agenda 
set by the United Nations, which includes monitoring and evaluation of the triple-bottom-
line commitments of each CDM project. Progress reports — on both employment and 
environmental impacts — must be submitted to the UNFCCC as currently stipulated for 
issuance of CERs. Additionally, key impact reports evaluating both sets of objectives 
should be conducted by a third party evaluator per UNFCCC and the host country’s 




The many challenges present in the Jardim Gramacho case make it a classic “wicked problem” 
marked by its highly-charged political nature, multitude of stakeholders and public interests, and 
complex issues of equity (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Schön further describes the difference 
between “wicked” and “tame” planning and policy problems as “manageable problems 
[addressed] through the application of research-based theory and technique [and] the swampy 
lowland [of] messy confusing problems [which] defy technical solution” (1987, 3). Wicked 
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planning problems, moreover, are characterized by a number of criteria related to the themes of 
problem statement complexity, solution development complexity, and solution assessment 
complexity (Balassiano, 2011). These criteria can help assess the validity of the solutions 
enacted for the Gramacho problem(s) in a more productive light. 
 
Wicked problems result in wicked solutions. This is exemplified through the municipal 
governments’ final resolution to Jardim Gramacho’s employment and local development 
dilemma, and follows the wicked problem characterizations outlined by Rittel and Webber, 
Abbott, Balassiano, and others. In accessing the multi-faceted, complex social, economic, 
environmental, infrastructural and political challenges present in Gramacho, the municipalities 
selected to tackle only the “catadores [employment] problem” in addition to environmental 
remediation of the landfill site. I followed suit in choosing to juxtapose the same set of objectives 
and challenges in my research question through the CDM and “sustainable development” lens. 
Both problem statements and problem formulations, however, fail to address many of the root 
problems of socioeconomic and infrastructural deprivations present in the community that 
ultimately prevent the employment compensation and environmental remediation solutions from 
producing notable positive change. Furthermore, both sets of problems also fail to acknowledge 
the needs of non-catador residents as distinct from catadores, resulting in a bias that assumes a 
solution for catadores can also benefit the Jardim Gramacho neighborhood as a whole. 
 
There is no ultimate answer to the equity question. Several philosophical debates have 
mentioned in the previous sections were discussed at length in stakeholder interviews on the 
equity of the Gramacho landfill closure and its subsequent catadores compensation 
negotiations. These discussions are encapsulated in the following controversial statements:  
(1) The Jardim Gramacho landfill should not have closed, as it offered the best livelihood 
option for the catadores population. 
(2) The Gramacho catadores were given a fair, democratic vote, and made the wrong 
decision in addressing their livelihood problem.  
While these statements were both supported and refuted by different stakeholders, debates are 
subjective and grounded on personal desired outcomes and values given the lack of an 
objective definition of equity and the indisputable public good. Each scenario and set of possible 
solutions poses new challenges of their own. Questions regarding “dignified livelihoods” and 
public health and environmental tradeoffs create overwhelming dilemmas in (1); whereas (2) 
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holds unresolvable debates on the merits of direct versus deliberative democracy for such a 
poorly educated and marginalized population, especially in light of the heightened political 
tensions at the community and municipal levels.   
 
Wicked solutions — fraught with their own imperfect discrepancies and complexities — arise in 
response to such scenarios, and cannot be meaningfully evaluated as true or false. Without a 
strict, predetermined set of desired outcomes and indicators, optimal solutions to wicked 
problems cannot be adequately developed. However, the same logic holds for the lack of an 
ultimate solution, as multiple efforts can be made to address the multiple facets and wicked 
problems of Jardim Gramacho. A few recommendations on current and future efforts at 
socioeconomic revitalization of the community are discussed below. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS: GRAMACHO BEYOND THE LANDFILL  
 
In addition to the interventions discussed in the previous chapters, new efforts have been made 
by Gramacho neighborhood groups, local civil society organizations, foundations, and private 
firms with the support of the Rio de Janeiro State government to invest in socioeconomic 
revitalization post-AMJG closure. These include, but are not limited to, the construction of a 
community recycling facility (Polo de reciclagem); technical skills training classes (FAETEC); 
new equipment and infrastructure for catadores (various catadores cooperative); and a new 
housing, infrastructure and “green clusters” business development master plan (IETS project). 
While promising, these projects are currently small in scope, scattered, are often exclusive of 
the greater community, and lack functional coordination to scale up their impact.  
 
Most notably, the Polo, FAETEC, and improvements made to the catadores business are only 
able to benefit a few among the many who desire and require such services. The Polo, at its 
maximum capacity, is able to only serve 400 individuals, less than 25% of the catadores 
displaced and less than 3% of the neighborhood population (Interviewee 15 and 19, 2013). 
FAETEC faces the same problem, and is further criticized for only focusing on very technical 
skills necessary for specific industries (e.g. computer and software skills). Provision of basic 
education (e.g. life training, basic reading and comprehension, banking and investment skills) 
that is compulsory for employment gain, particularly for this very marginalized population, is 
currently out of its scope. Lastly, gains in funding and sponsorship from outside sources for — 
whether through cash subsidy, equipment purchases, or physical space for operations — for 
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individual catadores groups has had limited positive impact on the neighborhood as a whole 
while further fueling competition and mistrust among the groups. Most cooperatives and 
associations, such as the most well-funded ACAMJG, are closed to new members and have 
very limited, capped enrollment. Many have also been accused of only providing services to 
families and friends, rather than the collective betterment of the neighborhood.  
 
From this, and other observations and analysis discussed earlier, I conclude with the following 
recommendations for state and municipal agencies, civil society groups, and local community 
groups to further Jardim Gramacho revitalization plans. While the Jardim Gramacho case 
contains many challenges unique to its local social and political context, the issues and 
recommendations presented in this study contain valuable implications and lessons for other 
Brazilian urban sustainability and waste management projects. The particular items below 
should be applied not only in this case, but also as a standard for all such projects: 
 
1. Address root causes of socioeconomic challenges.  
Per previous discussions, efforts must be made to address the social and infrastructural 
services that are desperately needed in the neighborhood, and serve as the heart of 
many of the socioeconomic challenges faced by all residents. Among these is the need 
by the Caxias Prefeitura to add police presence and provide security to the 
neighborhood, a basic tenet of government. This is critical in tackling the grave problems 
created by excessive drug trafficking and illegal waste disposal in the neighborhood. 
Police presence must provided in conjunction with improving the provision of basic 
utilities such as access to adequate water, sanitation, electricity, housing, and other 
essentials in socioeconomic development.  
 
2. Survey and organize neighborhood-level interests and factions. 
As of yet, no comprehensive survey or organization attempt has been made to formally 
record and share the different characteristics, goals, strategies, and points of difference 
between the multitude of catadores and other neighborhood-level groups in Jardim 
Gramacho. This data collection and analysis, and more importantly its distribution to all 
stakeholders, is critical in collective organization and needs assessment for the success 
of all neighborhood revitalization initiatives in addition to building a strong and dynamic 
sense of community within Jardim Gramacho. 
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3. Collaboration between groups on new initiatives. 
Civil society, government, and community-based groups actively working or planning on 
working in Gramacho should communicate and collaborate on their respective plans, 
organize and position their objectives with respect to each other, and pool resources to 
scale their impact. While easier said than done, the state and municipal governments, 
along with larger civil society groups, must serve as an umbrella entity to bring together 
the coalition of actors. This organization and collaboration is essential to prevent wasting 
resources on repeating the same projects and sharing best practices, techniques, and 
other useful information. Additionally, collaboration is important in aligning of goals, 
priorities and phasing to ensure the most productive and efficient timeline of activities. 
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Protecting Local Livelihoods in Urban Sustainable Development:  
The Case of Jardim Gramacho 
28 March 2013  ||  2:30 pm – 5:30 pm 
 
Studio-X Rio Workshop with Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (IETS) 




How can planners and policymakers best integrate global environmental interests with inclusive 
local development? In preparation for the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development, the 
Municipality of Rio de Janeiro and Duque de Caxias ordered the closure of Jardim Gramacho, 
the largest landfill in Latin America. Gramacho served not only as the disposal site for 80% of 
Rio’s municipal solid waste, it also provided livelihoods for approximately 2,000 catadores and 
an informal economy of up to 3,000 workers. Multiple waste-to-energy projects have been 
planned with the support of local agencies and international partners such as the World Bank, 
United Nations, US Environmental Protection Agency, and others following the closure. Despite 
the potential to generate thousands of jobs for local workers, the proposals focus neither on job 
creation and training, nor on the integration of catadores into the formal recycling system.  
 
Whether couched under “sustainable development”, “urban sustainability”, “urban resilience” or 
other terms, planning for the effects of rapid urbanization has been divided between the 
paradoxically competing interests of climate change mitigation and pro-poor economic 
development. Employment is often disconnected from the discourse and policies of 
sustainability and sustainable development — themes that often refer to environmental issues 
only. While Gramacho has great significance for both employment and environmental protection 
(3,000 informal workers and 60 million tons of waste), planning institutions have chosen to only 
address the latter.  
 
Discussions and idea-testing will include members from the diverse actors of the Gramacho 
interventions, including scholars, NGOs, architects, municipal and international policymakers, 
local community, and others. Through collaboration between stakeholder groups, this study will 
examine the opportunities and challenges of creating a more inclusive Gramacho that benefits 
the local community of informal workers as well as the Rio metro area. 
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PROGRAM 
 
First Event: Workshop on Gramacho 
 
2:30 pm. Panel discussion on Gramacho (60 minutes) 
4-5 speakers to present their work on Gramacho (15 minutes each) 
1. Research / NGO: IETS 
2. State government: RJ state PAC program & State Secretary of the Environment 
3. Municipal government: Duque de Caxias and Rio de Janeiro COMLURB  
4. Local community: members of multiple catadores cooperatives / associations and 
the Forum Comunitário de Jardim Gramacho 
Moderated question and answer session with speakers (15 minutes) 
 
4:00 pm. Working session in groups on themes and ideas for Gramacho redevelopment 
(60 minutes) 
Themes: Employment opportunities, Environmental remediation, Governance 
Open discussion with all participants on needs and challenges of current Gramacho 
conditions, and ideas for redevelopment.  
 
5:00 pm. Conclusions + Wrap-up (15 minutes) 




Second Event: Panel on Participation + Inclusive Urbanization 
 
6:30 pm. Inclusive urbanism: people’s involvement in social community  
development: Rocinha and Jardim Gramacho  
The event will focus on the relationship between experiences with participatory 
processes and architectural education. Researches and professional projects will be 
presented as selected case studies in different countries and communities, bringing to 
discussion the opportunities and limits these processes face. 
 
Speakers from Rocinha: 
1. Jonathas Magalhães Pereira da Silva – PUCCampinas 
2. Cleonice Santos – Social Services Assistant PAC  
3. Vera Tângari – Pro-Urbe, UFRJ 
 
Speakers form Gramacho: 
1. Fabricia Ramos – Researcher at IETS  
2. May Yu – Columbia University GSAPP 
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APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
1. What is your role, and the role of your organization, in this project? 
2. What is the main impetuous for your organization’s involvement in this project? 
3. How were the methods and processes for this project designed / selected? 
4. What factors (environmental, financial, local employment / economic development, 
other) were most influential in this decision? 
5. Which partner organizations were most influential in this decision? 
6. What were some alternatives to this? 
7. What are your organization’s indicators for success in this project? 
8. How many local jobs will be generated from this project? 
9. What local needs (other than environmental) were incorporated into the project design? 
How? 
10. To what extent were community groups and needs of local residents incorporated into 
the planning of this project?  
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW SUBJECT AFFILIATIONS 
 
Stakeholder and informant interviews were conducted with individuals from the aforementioned 
groups as the primary data source for this study. Individuals were recruited on a voluntary basis 
only and cited anonymously to protect their identity. The information below contains a basic 
profile of interview subjects, with minimal disclosure of their stakeholder affiliations to 
contextually place their respective opinions and perspectives within the research and analysis.  
 
 
INTERVIEWEE STAKEHOLDER GROUP AFFLIATION 
1. Rio de Janeiro municipal government  
2. Rio de Janeiro municipal government J 
3. Rio de Janeiro municipal government 
4.  Duque de Caxias municipal government 
5.  Independent Jardim Gramacho researcher + Rio resident 
6.  Local NGO researcher  
7.  Local NGO researcher  
8.  Local NGO researcher  
9. Novo Gramacho 
10 Jardim Gramacho community group 
11. Jardim Gramacho resident non-catador 
12. Jardim Gramacho ex-catador (non-organized)  
13.  Jardim Gramacho catador cooperative 
14. Jardim Gramacho catador cooperative 
15. Jardim Gramacho catador cooperative 
16. Rio de Janeiro State government 
17. Rio de Janeiro State government 
18. International NGO 
19. International NGO 
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